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TWO ESSAYS ON CORPORATE FINANCE  
 
This dissertation consists of two essays on corporate finance. The first essay 
investigates the relationship between dual-class shares and firm’s risk-taking. While costs 
associated with dual-class shares are widely documented, the benefits are seldom studied 
in the literature. We attempt to fill this gap and find that dual-class firms tend to have fewer 
business segments, higher volatilities in their cash flows, earnings, and investment 
opportunities compared to propensity-matched single-class firms. Business segments 
within a dual-class firm are also more positively correlated in their cash flows, earnings, or 
investment opportunities than those in single-class firms. The results are consistent with 
the hypothesis that dual-class shares can potentially shield insiders from short-term market 
pressure so they can focus on riskier projects to enhance long-term shareholder value.        
To provide a possible channel through which dual-class firms can increase corporate             
risk-taking, we examine one of the most important corporate investment decisions: mergers 
and acquisitions (M&As). Dual-class firms are more likely to engage in M&As, especially 
nondiversifying M&As. Corporate risks increase following M&As, and the increase is 
more for dual-class firms than for single-class firms. 
 
The second essay shows how CEO skills affect operating performance using              
a sample of 109 spin-offs from 1994 to 2009. Since a variety of studies indicate that firms 
in need of external financing are more likely to engage in spin-offs, we hypothesize that 
parent firms prefer to appoint financial experts as CEOs at spun-off units around spin-off 
transactions.  We find that appointing spun-off unit CEOs with financial expertise brings 
significant and positive wealth effects.  Furthermore, the CEOs with financial expertise 
significantly improve firms’ access to capital markets and subsequent operating 
performance.  Conversely, we do not observe positive wealth effects at the spin-off 
announcement or improved operating performance following spin-offs when parent firms 
decide to assign non-financial experts as spun-off unit CEOs.     
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Chapter One: Corporate Risk-Taking in Dual-Class Firms 
1. Introduction 
Agency costs associated with antitakeover provisions in general and dual-class 
shares in particular are widely documented in the literature. For example, Masulis, Wang, 
and Xie (2009) find that, in dual-class firms, as the wedge between insiders’ voting rights 
and cash flow rights increases, corporate cash holdings are worth less, CEOs receive higher 
compensation, and managers make more value-destroying acquisitions. Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick (2010) find that dual-class firms trade at lower valuations than single-class 
firms.  
However, dual-class shares, along with other antitakeover provisions, are still very 
prevalent in the corporate world. For example, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) find 
that both the mean and median of the number of antitakeover provisions in their sample 
are around nine. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang (2013) document that about half of the over 
3,000 public companies tracked by FactSet Research Systems have a staggered board. 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2010) report that about 6% of all Compustat firms are         
dual-class firms, including many prestigious corporations (e.g., Google, Nike, Comcast, 
and Berkshire-Hathaway). 
Some studies argue that dual-class shares have their benefits. The ability of         
dual-class shares to shield managers from short-term market pressure so that management 
can focus on creating long-term value for investors has been recognized by some 
researchers. Stein (1988) argues that antitakeover provisions may benefit shareholders by 
mitigating managerial myopia because antitakeover provisions reduce a firm’s exposure to 
takeover threats, which in turn encourage managers to undertake long-term and risky 
2 
 
investments. Chemmanur and Jiao (2012) argue that dual-class shares may increase      
long-term firm value in the hands of high ability managers, even though it may increase 
agency costs and destroy firm value in the hands of low ability managers. They argue that 
the dual-class share structure allows high ability managers to create value for the firm by 
investing in risky, long-term projects without worrying about losing control of the firm.  
Empirically, however, very few studies have focused on the benefits of dual-class 
shares. We attempt to fill this gap by examining how dual-class firms differ from         
single-class firms in corporate risk-taking. We find that dual-class firms exhibit higher firm 
risks. Specifically, dual-class firms have fewer business segments than propensity-matched 
single-class firms. While dual-class firms on average have 1.115 segments,                             
the propensity-matched single-class firms have an average of 1.234 segments. Dual-class 
firms also have higher volatilities in their cash flows, earnings, and investment 
opportunities, and they have higher cross-segment correlations in cash flows, earnings, and 
investment opportunities. These results indicate that dual-class firms tend to have higher 
firm risks than single-class firms.  
Among dual-class firms, there are significant variations in the wedge between the 
percentage of voting rights controlled by insiders and the percentage of cash flow rights 
controlled by insiders. We find that corporate risks as measured by volatilities and        
cross-segment correlations in cash flows, earnings, and investment opportunities are 
positively related to this wedge, while the number of business segments is negatively 
related to the wedge, within the sample of dual-class firms. The results are consistent with 
the notion that dual-class shares insulate managers from short-term market pressure so that 
they can take greater corporate risks. 
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To provide a channel through which dual-class firms engage in corporate              
risk-taking, we examine mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in our sample period. M&As 
are one of the most important corporate investment decisions firms have to make, and they 
greatly affect firm risks. We find that dual-class firms engage in more M&As than       
single-class firms. Further, dual-class firms are more likely to engage in nondiversifying 
M&As, and less likely to engage in diversifying M&As. Because nondiversifying M&As 
tend to increase corporate risks more than diversifying M&As, this is consistent with the 
idea that dual-class firms are more likely to increase firm risks than single-class firms. We 
then look at changes in firm risks around M&As, and find that dual-class firms indeed have 
a greater change in risks than single class firms, as measured by volatilities and cross-
segment correlations in cash flows, earnings, and investment opportunities. 
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we provide evidence 
on how the dual-class share structure affects corporate investment decisions. By 
documenting that dual-class firms engage in more risk-taking, we show that dual-class 
shares may indeed be beneficial to shareholders because they allow managers to take on 
risky but value-increasing projects. Second, our study contributes to the literature on     
dual-class share structure. While existing studies on dual-class firms examine firm value 
(Gompers et al., 2010), managerial compensation and investment behavior (Masulis et al., 
2009), mispricing of dual-class shares (Schulz and Shive, 2010), capital structure (Dey, 
Nikolaev, and Wang, 2009), board structure (Jiang, 2010), earnings management activities 
(Nguyen and Xu, 2010), corporate payout policies (Jordan, Liu, and Wu, 2014), stock 
issuance (Gokkaya, 2011), and short-term market pressure (Jordan, Kim, and Liu, 2015), 
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the benefits of dual-class shares have not been examined in depth. Our study attempts to 
fill this gap.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss the related literature 
in Section 2. Sample selection and some descriptive statistics are reported in Section 3. 
Empirical results based on dual-class and single-class firms and results within dual-class 
firms based on the wedge between insiders’ voting rights and cash flow rights are reported 
in Section 4.  Section 5 reports results using the M&A sample. Section 6 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. Related literature  
We investigate how dual-class shares affect firms’ risk-taking behavior. Naturally, 
our study is related to two strands of literature: studies on the dual-class share structure and 
studies related to firms’ risk-taking behavior. 
Some studies suggest that the dual-class share structure can potentially enhance 
shareholder value. For example, Stein (1988) argues that the dual-class share structure and 
other antitakeover provisions may mitigate managerial myopia. Chemmanur and Jiao 
(2012) argue that dual-class shares may increase long-term firm value in the hands of high 
ability managers. However, other studies associate dual-class share structure with lower 
firm values and higher agency problems (Masulis et al., 2009; Gompers et al., 2010). 
Bebchuk and Weisbach (2010) suggest that the main governance problem for firms with 
controlling shareholders (which is the case for most dual-class firms; e.g., Gompers et al., 
2010, find that insiders in dual-class firms have on average 60% of voting rights) is the 
expropriation of wealth by controlling shareholders at the expense of minority 
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shareholders. Many recent studies examine how dual-class shares affect different aspects 
of corporate financing decisions, such as firm value (Gompers et al., 2010), managerial 
compensation and investment behavior (Masulis et al., 2009), mispricing of dual-class 
shares (Schulz and Shive, 2010), capital structure (Dey, Nikolaev, and Wang, 2009), board 
structure (Jiang, 2010), earnings management activities (Nguyen and Xu, 2010), corporate 
payout policies (Jordan, Liu, and Wu, 2014), stock issuance (Gokkaya, 2011), and        
short-term market pressure (Jordan, Kim, and Liu, 2015). 
For corporate risk-taking, many studies investigate how managerial risk choices in 
investment decisions affect firm’s growth and productivity. Actually, the question consists 
of two parts: examining the determinants of firm’s risk-taking behavior and the relationship 
between taking risky projects and maximizing shareholder wealth.  
First, for the determinants of firm’s risk-taking behavior, the majority of studies 
look at how certain firm characteristics affect managerial risk-taking in investment 
decisions. Holmstron (1979) shows that increasing compensation sensitivity to firm 
performance reduces managers’ risk-reducing activities. Coles et al. (2006) also show that 
a sensitivity to stock volatility in the managerial compensation (i.e. vega) is positively 
associated with R&D expenditures and firm leverage, which means that executives with 
higher vega are more likely to invest in risker assets and implement aggressive debt policy. 
However, Hayes et al. (2012) provide evidence that stock-based compensation does not 
provide incentives for risk-taking by mangers. Specifically, they show that managerial 
stock option schemes are mostly driven by accounting benefits based on changes in the 
accounting treatment of stock option under FAS 123R.  
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There are also studies that investigate how the ownership structure are related to 
corporate risk-taking. Boubakri et al. (2013) suggest that since social stability is a major 
priority for government policies, newly privatized firms (NPFs) owned by governments 
tend to have constraints on undertaking risky projects. However, NPFs mostly controlled 
by foreign owners are more likely to implement risky projects, resulting in increased 
earnings volatility. Faccio at al. (2011) show that diversified large shareholders are more 
likely to make firms undertake risky investment than nondiversified large shareholders, 
resulting in significantly increased volatility of firm-level profitability. Additionally, other 
studies look at the relationship between managerial traits or experience and corporate 
investment decisions. Faccio et al. (2014) shows that firms run by female CEOs have lower 
leverage and volatility in earnings than firms run by male CEO.  Firms that changed a CEO 
from male to female experience significant reduction in corporate risk-taking. Cain and 
McKeon (2015) provide evidence that firms run by CEOs with private pilot’s licenses, 
proxy for personal risk-taking, show higher equity return volatility.  
Some studies examine how external governance affects firms’ risk-taking behavior. 
John et al. (2008) investigate how risk choices in corporate investments are affected by 
country-level investor protection. Since investor protection as monitors of managerial 
behaviors weaken the pursuit of manager’s private benefits, it leads to a positive 
relationship between investor protection and corporate risk-taking. In addition, Kim and 
Lu (2011) find that weak external governance measured by industry concentration ratio 
induces manager’s risk-reducing activities, especially when CEOs have high wealth-
performance sensitivity and the majority of control rights.                 
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Second, many studies examine the relationship between undertaking risky projects 
and enhancing shareholder wealth. In general, these studies consider M&A activities and 
the number of business segments as important channels through which investment 
decisions can increase firms’ risks (Graham, Harvey and Puri, 2014; Cain and McKeon, 
2015; Coles et al, 2006). Hermalin and Katz (2000) explain that diversification decisions 
appear to have negative impact on shareholders wealth. This is because diversification 
decisions might split managers’ given level of efforts among multiple projects, 
consequently reducing the probability that any given project will succeed. In addition, 
John, Litov, and Yeung (2008) suggest that the volatility of firm-level profitability has a 
positive impact on long-term firm growth. For acquisition activities, Malmedier and Tate 
(2003) suggest that overconfident or risk-seeking CEOs are more likely to execute       
value-destroying acquisitions. However, Cain and McKeon (2015) document that there is 
no evidence of value-destroying M&As led by CEOs who possess private pilot’s licenses, 
proxy for personal risk-taking. 
 
3. Data and key variables 
In this section, we explain the process of data construction and key variables in this 
study and report sample distributions by year and descriptive statistics. We will also 
compare firm risks between dual-class and single-class firms.        
3.1. Dual-class and single-class firms 
To construct the sample of dual-class firms, we first identify dual-class firms from 
the sample used by Gompers et al (2010) and Smart and Zutter (2003). Additionally, we 
supplement the sample by hand-collecting dual-class firms as follows.  If a firm has more 
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than 5% difference in its number of shares outstanding in Compustat and CRSP, we 
consider it a potential dual-class firm because Compustat reports the number of shares in 
all share classes, whereas CRSP reports the number of shares of a specific class of common 
stock. Next, we look at the firm’s annual financial statement (Form-10K) to confirm 
whether the firm is actually a dual-class firm. Additionally, we exclude 19 cases of dual-
class recapitalization that changes from single-class to dual-class structure and 105 cases 
of share unification that eliminates dual-class shares and merges into single-class shares 
during our sample period from 1994 to 2011. We exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000 
– 6999) and utility firms (SIC code 4900 – 4999) from our sample.  
In order to address potential endogeneity concerns, we use a propensity score 
matching method to find a matching single-class firm for each dual-class firm. We estimate 
the following logistic model for all dual- and single-class firms in the IPO year (Dey et 
al.,2009; Gompers et al., 2012):  
                        Prob(Dual=1)=α0+β1Name+β2Media+β3StateLaw+β4SalesRank+ 
                                                  β5ProfitRank+β6%Firms+β7%Sales+β8%RegionSales+ 
                                                 β9Lgsz+IndustryDummies+IPOYearDummies+µit.           (1) 
Dual is equal to 1 if firm i is a dual-class firm at IPO; 0 otherwise. Name is a dummy 
variable with value 1 if the firm’s name at IPO contains a person’s name; 0 otherwise. 
Media equals 1 if the firm is a media company, and 0 otherwise.1 StateLaw is the state law 
antitakeover index from Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). SalesRank is the percentile 
ranking of the IPO-year sales of the firm relative to other firms with the same IPO year. 
ProfitRank is the percentile ranking of the IPO-year profits of the firm relative to other 
                                                          
1 Media companies have SIC codes 2710-11, 2720-21, 2730-31, 4860, 4832-33, 4840-41, 7810, or 7820. 
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firms with the same IPO year. %Firms is the percentage of all Compustat firms located in 
the same metropolitan or metropolitan statistical area (MSA) as firm i in the year before 
the firm’s IPO. %Sales is the percentage of sales from firms in the same MSA as firm i in 
the year before the firm’s IPO. %RegionSales is the ratio of firm i’s sales to the sales of all 
firms in the same MSA. Lgsz is the log of the firm’s total assets.  
In Table 1.1, we present the number of dual-class, unmatched single-class, and 
propensity-matched single-class firms during the period of 1994 to 2011. An average of 
215 dual-class firms exist during the period with a maximum of 285 firms in 1997 and a 
minimum of 159 firms in 2011. Although it appears to show a decreased number of dual-
class firms after 2000, the proportion of dual-class to single-class firms is quite consistent 
throughout the period at around 12%. Additionally, our sample contains only about 25% 
of single-class firms in Compustat due to segment, correlation, and volatility measurement 
restrictions, as we will explain in sections 3.2 and 3.3. 
3.2. Segment and mergers and acquisitions (M&As) information 
We use the number of segments as one measure of corporate risk-taking behavior. 
For firms’ segment information, we use Compustat’s segment files, specifically focusing 
on firm’s business segments and using only the latest source year of each segment-year 
observation. We then filter the sample by dropping the following firms; (i) firms with 
missing sales or SIC codes in at least one segment, (ii) firms with at least one segment 
operating in the financial (SIC codes of 6000-6999) or utility sector (SIC codes 4900-
4999), and (iii) firms with market capitalizations less than $10 million. We also exclude 
firms if the sum of segment sales differs 1% or more from the total net sales of the firm 
(Berger and Ofek, 1995). After imposing the restrictions on the segment data, a firm is 
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defined as a single-segment firm if it has only one segment and a multi-segment firm 
otherwise. For the industry definitions, we use 4-digit SIC codes and require each industry 
to have at least five single-segment firms and each firm in the industry to have at least $10 
million in sales over the last 10 years. (Amit, 2013; Jordan, Liu and Wu, 2015).  
To investigate the difference in corporate risk-taking between dual- and single-class 
firms, we also examine how dual-class firms’ mergers and acquisitions (M&As) activities 
differ from single-class firms. We use the Securities Data Company’s (SDC) U.S. Mergers 
and Acquisitions Database to construct a sample of M&As. We use domestic M&As where 
a U.S public firm acquires a U.S public target with execution dates between 1994 and 2011. 
In addition, we exclude M&A deals that acquiring firms owned more than 50% of the 
target’s stock prior to the acquisitions or own less than 50% after the acquisition. We 
further require the minimum deal value of the acquisition to be $10 million in constant 
2007 dollars. An acquisition is defined as a diversifying M&A if the acquirer and the target 
have different 4-digit SIC codes; otherwise, it is defined as a nondiversifying M&A. 
3.3. Measures of firm risks  
To measure the outcomes of corporate risk-taking behavior, we construct several 
variables: volatilities and cross-segment correlations in investment opportunities, cash 
flows, and earnings. Investment opportunity is measured by Tobin’s Q, cash flow is the 
ratio of earnings less interest and taxes to assets, and earnings is the earnings per share 
(EPS) from Compustat. 
To measure cross-segment correlations and volatilities, we rely on annual average 
of Tobin’s Q, cash flow, and earnings across all single-segment firms based on 4-digit SIC 
codes. Additionally, we require at least five years of non-missing data in Q, cash flow, and 
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earnings over the past 10 years. For the cross-segment correlation of investment 
opportunities, we estimate a pair-wise correlation between all segments using prior 10-year 
average industry Tobin’s Q based on single-segment firms in the industry as follows 
(Jordan, Liu, and Wu, 2015):  
     𝑄 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟 = ∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑝(𝑗)
𝑛
𝑞=1
𝑛
𝑝=1 𝑤𝑖𝑞(𝑘)𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟[𝑡−10,𝑡−1](𝑗, 𝑘)          (2) 
where 𝑤𝑖𝑝(𝑗) is the sales share of segment p of firm i operating in industry j,  𝑤𝑖𝑞(𝑘) is the 
sales share of segment q of firm i operating in industry k, and 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟[𝑡−10,𝑡−1](𝑗, 𝑘) is the 
estimated correlation of Tobin’s Q between industries j and k over the past ten years. The 
Correlation in cash flow and earnings are constructed similarly, except that we use cash 
flow and earnings instead of Tobin’s Q. For pure play firms, correlations are 1 since the 
firm has only one segment so all Q, cash flows, and earnings are in the same industry by 
definition. Next, to define the volatility in investment opportunity, we follow Duchin 
(2010) and estimate the following measure for all firms in our sample:  
              𝜎(𝑄)𝑡,𝑘 = √∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑤𝑗𝜌(𝑄)𝑖,𝑗𝜎(𝑄)𝑡,𝑘
𝑖 𝜎(𝑄)𝑡,𝑘
𝑗𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑖=1                 (3) 
where 𝜎(𝑄)𝑖 denotes the standard deviation of Tobin’s Q of segment 𝑖 and 𝜌(𝑄)𝑖,𝑗 is the 
correlation of Tobin’s Q between industries to which segments 𝑖 and 𝑗 belong.  
3.4. Univariate tests of firm risks between dual-class and single-class firms  
We hypothesize that dual-class firms take more risks in their firms’ operation than 
single-class firms. This is because dual-class share structures insulate managers from short-
term market pressure (Jordan, Kim, and Liu, 2015). Thus, we expect dual-class firms to 
take on more firm risk and operate in one or two lines of business instead of many different 
sectors. That is, we expect dual-class firms to have fewer business segments than single-
class firms. Consequently, we expect dual-class firms to have higher correlations and 
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volatilities in Tobin’s Q, cash flows, and earnings than single-class firms. In Table 1.2, we 
compare the mean difference in these measures of corporate risk between dual-class and 
single-class firms.  
Results in Table 1.2 support our hypothesis that dual-class firms take more risks 
than single-class firms. Dual-class firms have fewer segments than single-class firms. The 
average number of segments for dual-class firms is 1.115, while that that for single-class 
firms is 1.209, and the difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. Because the 
number of segments for a firm is highly correlated over time for the same firm, we first 
calculate the difference in the average number of segments between dual- and single-class 
firms, and then calculate the average difference over time and the associated t-values based 
on Newey-West standard errors with one-year lag.2 We calculate the statistical significance 
in other measures of corporate risk-taking similarly. The correlations and volatilities of 
Tobin’s Q, cash flows, and earnings are all higher for dual-class firms than for single-class 
firms.  
In the right three columns in Table 1.2, we compare measures of corporate risks 
between dual-class and propensity-matched single-class firms. We find similar results as 
in the first three columns. Dual-class firms have fewer number of segments, and higher 
values of correlations and volatilities in Tobin’s Q, cash flow, and earnings than single-
class firms. 
3.5. Comparison of firm characteristics between dual- and single-class firms  
 Univariate tests in Table 1.2 shows that dual-class firms appear to have higher 
corporate risks than single-class firms. However, it is plausible that factors other than the 
                                                          
2 Results are unchanged if we use two or three years lag. 
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dual-class share structure also affect corporate risk-taking. Thus, we control firms’ other 
characteristics on multi-variate regression models in later sections to see whether dual-
class shares per se actually affect firm risks. For example, we control for firm size measured 
as the firm’s market capitalization of equity because young and small firms tend to have 
fewer number of segments and higher correlations and volatilities than large and mature 
firms.3 We also control for the book-to-market ratio of the firm because firms with low 
book-to-market ratios tend to show similar tendencies with small firms. Other firm 
characteristics are stock returns, leverage, dividends, and the number of shares that are 
commonly used in previous studies (see Appendix for details). Table 1.3 describes the 
various variables employed as control variables in this study.                  
Difference (1) in Table 1.3 shows that dual-class firms differ significantly from 
single-class firms in Compustat in many dimensions. Specifically, single-class firms are 
significantly smaller than dual-class firms in market capitalization and total assets. The 
average market capitalization is $1,303.78 million and $851.23 million for dual-class and 
single-class firms, respectively. Dual-class firms tend to have higher leverage, are more 
likely to pay dividends, and have higher ROA. The number of shareholders for dual-class 
firms (7.6 thousand) is significantly lower than single-class firms (31.38 thousand), likely 
because many of the super-voting shares of dual-class firms are untradeable or illiquid. 
Difference (2) in Table 1.3 compares dual-class and propensity-matched single-class firms. 
In general, the descriptive statistics in Table 1.3 are similar to those in previous studies 
                                                          
3 For dual-class firms with non-tradeable super-voting shares, we do not have a market price for super-
voting shares. The market value of equity for these firms is defined as the price of the inferior-voting shares 
multiplied by the total number of shares outstanding (i.e. the sum of the number of inferior-voting shares 
and super-voting shares). The market value of equity for other dual-class firms is the sum of the market 
value of inferior-voting shares and the market value of superior-voting shares. 
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(e.g., Jordan, Kim, and Liu, 2015) although we drop more than 70% of single-class firms 
in Compustat due to sample restrictions, as explained in section 3.2 and 3.3. 
 
4. Results based on dual-class and single-class firms 
 To investigate dual-class firms’ risk-taking behavior, this section shows regression 
results of how dual-class shares affect the number of segments and correlation and 
volatility in Q, cash flow, and earnings, after controlling for other variables described in 
section 3.5. In addition, we explore how the wedge between insiders’ voting rights and 
cash flow rights affects dual-class firms’ risk-taking behavior. 
4.1. Results based on dual-class and single-class firms  
To estimate the effect of dual-class share structure on corporate risk-taking, we use 
multi-variate regression models and present results in Table 1.4. Specifically, Panel A of 
Table 1.4 reports regression results on how the number of segments and correlations and 
volatilities of Q, cash flow, and earnings are related to the dual-class share structure based 
on the sample of dual-class and single-class firms from Compustat. After controlling all 
other factors that may affect firm’s risk-taking behavior, coefficients on the dual-class 
dummy in all seven models are statistically significance at the 1% level. The results 
indicates that dual-class firms tend to have fewer number of segments and higher 
correlations and volatilities than single-class firms.  
For example, the coefficient for the dual-class dummy is -0.119 in model (1). The 
coefficient indicates that for dual-class firms we expect the number of segments to be fewer 
by an average of 0.119 than single-class firms. Additionally, the coefficient for the dual-
class dummy is 3.67 dollars in model (7), which means that on average, earnings volatility 
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of dual-class firms is 3.67 dollars higher compared to single-class firms. The results in 
Panel B are qualitatively similar based on dual-class and propensity-matched single-class 
firms.        
4.2. Results based on dual-class firms only 
To provide further evidence in support of our hypothesis that dual-class firms are 
able to take on more risky projects because insiders in these firms are insulated from short-
term market pressures, we also identify situations where there are significant differences 
between voting rights and cash flow rights within firms with dual-class shares. For the 
within sample tests, our variable of interest is the wedge variable (VOratio). We follow 
previous studies (e.g., Harvey, Lins, and Roper, 2004; Masulis et al., 2009) and define 
VOratio as the ratio of the percentage of a firm’s voting rights controlled by insiders to the 
percentage of cash flow rights controlled by insiders. Because the higher the value of the 
wedge variable, the more insulated insiders are from short-term market pressure and thus 
can choose risky projects among efficient investment opportunities, we expect VOratio to 
be negatively related to the firm’s number of segments and positively related to correlation 
and volatility in Q, cash flow, and earnings.  
Table 1.5 shows the results that the effect of VOratio on the number of segments is 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level (model (1)). We also observe a positive 
effect of VOratio on correlations and volatilities in all six measures and the effect is 
statistically significant at the 0.01 or 0.05 level in model (2) through (7).   
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5. A possible mechanism of corporate risk-taking: mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
So far, our results support the hypothesis that dual-class firms tend to take on more 
corporate risks, resulting in fewer number of segments and higher volatility and cross-
segment correlation in Q, cash flows, and earnings than single-class firms. In this section, 
we provide further evidence for our hypothesis using the M&A sample. M&As are one of 
the most important investment decisions made by firms. Our previous results show that 
dual-class firms have higher risks than single-class firms. The M&A sample can potentially 
provide a mechanism through which dual-class firms tend to have higher risks: they may 
make more M&As and take on riskier M&As than single-class firms.  
5.1. Univariate tests of the frequency of M&As  
Panel A in Table 1.6 reports a time profile of the number of M&As for dual-class 
and single-class firms by year during the sample period 1994 -2011. Further, each 
acquisition is defined as a diversifying M&A if the acquirer and the target have the same 
4-digit SIC code; otherwise, it is defined as a nondiversifying M&A. For dual-class firms, 
the number of M&As varies during the sample period: a low of 15 in 2010 and a high of 
67 in 1999. The number of acquisitions for single-class firms appears to show similar 
patterns with dual-class firms.  
Since Panel A consists of dual-class and all Compustat single-class firms, the total 
number of M&As for dual-class firms is significantly fewer (664 versus 9343). However, 
if we look at the proportion of nondiversifying and diversifying M&As to the total number 
of acquisition activities, dual-class firms tend to have more nondiversifying and less 
diversifying acquisitions than single-class firms. This tendency is clearly shown in Panel 
B based on dual-class and propensity-matched single-class firms. For example, dual-class 
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firms have 516 M&As and the propensity-matched single-class firms have 390 M&As. In 
addition, 63 % of dual-class firms’ acquisitions are classified as nondiversifying M&As, 
whereas single-class firms have 48% of nondiversifying M&As. To investigate whether 
this finding is also statistically significant across all years, we have univariate tests in   
Table 1.7. 
In Table 1.7, we compare the probability of M&As between dual-class and single-
class firms. We also examine the probability of nondiversifying and diversifying M&As 
between dual-class and single-class firms. The sample in Table 1.7 consists of dual-class 
and single-class firms regardless of whether or not firms have M&A activities. Specifically, 
the probability of M&As is the ratio of the total number of M&As to the total number of 
dual-class or single-class firms in a given year. In addition, the probability of 
nondiversifying (diversifying) M&As is the ratio of the total number of nondiversifying 
(diversifying) M&As to the total number of dual-class or single-class firms’ M&A 
activities. Diversifying and nondiversifying M&As are classified based on acquiring and 
target firms’ 4, 3, and 2-digit SIC code. Difference (1) and (2) show the difference between 
dual-class and single-class firms and between dual-class and propensity-matched single-
class firms, respectively.      
In difference (1), dual-class firms have an average 11.5% chance of engage in an 
M&A in a given year while single-class firms in Compustat have an average chance of 
7.2%. The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. At the same time, dual-
class firms are more likely to make nondiversifying acquisitions than single-class firms 
across all industry classifications based on 4-, 3-, or 2- digit SIC codes. For example, based 
on 4-digit SIC codes classification, 47.3% of dual-class firms’ acquisitions are 
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nondiversifying M&As, significantly higher by 13% than single-class firms’ 
nondiversifying M&As. Difference (2) in Table 1.7 also shows that dual-class firms have 
significantly higher probability of M&A activities and are more likely to have 
nondiversifying acquisitions than propensity-matched single-class firms. In summary, the 
finding in Table 1.7 supports our hypothesis that dual-class firms appear to be more likely 
to engage in nondiversifying M&As and less likely to engage in diversifying M&As than 
single-class firms.            
5.2. Logit regression analysis of M&As 
The univariate tests in Table 1.7 show that dual-class firms tend to have 
significantly fewer number of diversifying and greater number of nondiversifying 
acquisitions than single-class firms. At the same time, the total number of M&As for dual-
class firms is significantly greater than single-class firms. This finding is consistent with 
our hypothesis that dual-class firms have a strong tendency to take risky projects in general. 
However, there are many other factors that may affect the firm’s risk-taking behavior, and 
we want to test whether dual-class shares still affect a firm’s M&A decision, especially a 
diversifying or a nondiversifying acquisition after controlling for other factors: firm size, 
book-to-market ratio, leverage, dividend, turnover, and stock returns (see Appendix for 
details). 
In Table 1.8, we run logit models, with the M&A dummy as the dependent variable, 
which takes value 1 if a firm completes an M&A in year t and 0 otherwise. In addition, we 
have two more dependent variables as nondiversifying and diversifying M&A dummy. The 
sample includes dual-class and all single-class firms in models (1)-(3) and dual-class and 
propensity-matched single-class firms in models (4)-(6). Since use panel data, we use 
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standard errors clustered at the firm level and at the year level (2-way clustering). We also 
include the year dummies to capture the year fixed effects. Table 1.8 shows that after 
controlling for firm size, book-to-market ratio, 1-year prior stock return, leverage, 
dividend, and stock turnover, the dual-class firms are more likely to engage in M&As. At 
the same time, acquisitions made by dual-class firms are more likely to be non-diversified. 
This is true whether we look at dual-class and single-class firms or dual-class and 
propensity-matched single-class firms.   
5.3. Changes in firm risks around M&As 
We show that dual-class firms have higher frequency of M&A activities than 
single-class firms. In addition, the acquisitions of dual-class firms are more likely to be 
nondiversifying acquisitions. Our interpretation for this finding is that insiders of dual-
class firms are more willing to take risky projects because they are insulated from short-
term market pressure. So, if our hypothesis is correct, then we expect dual-class firms’ 
number of segment to increase less and correlations and volatilities to increase more than 
single-class firms after mergers and acquisitions. Thus, in this section, we compare the 
change in the number of segments and correlation and volatility in Q, cash flow and 
earnings between dual- and single-class firms. Specifically, we measure changes as 
differences in the value eight quarters (i.e. two years) before M&As and the value eight 
quarters (i.e. two years) after M&As. 
Table 1.9 presents the results of how changes in the number of segments, 
correlations, and volatilities differ around M&A between dual-class and single-class firms 
in difference (1) and between dual-class and matching single-class firms in difference (2). 
After acquisitions, the number of segments for dual-class firms increases by 0.09, while 
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the number of single-class firms increases by 0.30 and the difference (-0.21) is statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level. These results are in line with our previous finding that dual-
class firms are more likely to have nondiversifying M&As. Additionally, single-class 
firms’ negative changes in correlation and volatility in Q, cash flow, and earnings support 
our previous finding that single-class firms are more likely to have diversifying 
acquisitions (i.e. less risky projects), resulting in increased number of segments after 
acquisitions. For example, while earnings volatility for single-class firms decreases by an 
average of 27.80 dollars, dual-class firms’ earnings volatility increases by an average          
of 23.52 dollars after M&As. 
5.4. Regression analyses explaining changes in firm risks around M&As  
To estimate the causal effect, we perform regression of changes in the number of 
segments, correlations and volatilities on dual-class share structure, using the sample of 
dual-class and single-class firms that completed mergers and acquisitions during the period 
of 1994-2011. Specifically, Panel A and B in Table 1.10 include the sample of dual-class 
and single-class firms and dual-class and propensity-matched single-class firms, 
respectively. In regression models, dependent variables are differences between an average 
of the number of segments, correlations and volatilities in eight quarters (i.e. two years) 
before and after M&As. We also use the ratio of a target firm’s market value to an 
acquirer’s market value (i.e. relative size) as one of control variables. Other control 
variables are the same as those we used in previous regression models.  
Across all samples in Panels A and B, coefficients on dual-class share dummy are 
negative in model (1) and statistically significant, suggesting that dual-class firms are more 
likely to engage in nondiversifying acquisitions. The negative coefficient on the dual-class 
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dummy in model (1) does not mean that the number of segments for dual-class firms 
actually decreases after acquisitions. It means that single-class firms have a relatively high 
proportion of diversifying M&As compared to dual-class firms as shown in Table 1.9 (that 
is, the number of segments increase less compared to single-class firm M&As). 
Additionally, we also see positive and statistically significant coefficient on the dual-class 
shares in models (1) – (7) in both Panels A and B. These results indicate that after M&As, 
dual-class firms experience a significantly increased correlation and volatilities in 
investment opportunity, cash flow, and earnings.  
 
6. Conclusion 
While costs associated with dual-class shares are widely documented, the benefits 
are seldom studied in the literature. We attempt to fill this gap and find that dual-class firms 
tend to have fewer business segments, higher volatilities in their cash flows, earnings, and 
investment opportunities compared to propensity-matched single-class firms. Business 
segments within the firm are also more positively correlated in their cash flows, earnings, 
or investment opportunities. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that dual-class 
share can potentially shield insiders from short-term market pressure so that they can focus 
on riskier projects to enhance long-term shareholder value. To address endogeneity 
concerns and to provide a possible channel through which dual-class firms can increase 
corporate risk-taking, we examine one of the most important corporate investment 
decisions: mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Dual-class firms are more likely to engage 
in M&As, especially nondiversifying M&As. Corporate risks increase following M&As, 
and the increase is more for dual-class firms than for single-class firms.  
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Table 1.1: Distribution of dual-class and single-class firms by year 
 
This table presents the number of dual-class and single-class firms during our sample 
period from 1994 to 2011 in Compustat. The sample firms with dual-class shares are 
collected from Gompers et al. (2010), Smart and Zutter (2003), and firms’ annual financial 
reports (Form 10-K). The third and last columns report the number of all Compustat single-
class firms and the number of propensity-matched single-class firms, respectively. We 
restrict single-class firms based on segments, correlation, and volatility measurement 
explained in section 3. In addition, we find a matching single-class firm for each dual-class 
firm based on a propensity score matching method, similar to Armstrong et al. (2010),     
Dey et al. (2009) and Gompers et al. (2010). 
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Year 
Number of 
dual-class firms 
Number of 
single-class firms % 
Number of propensity-matched 
single-class firms 
     
1994 218 1,982 0.11 209 
1995 251 2,039 0.12 209 
1996 277 2,146 0.13 202 
1997 285 2,227 0.13 227 
1998 277 2,135 0.13 234 
1999 265 1,808 0.15 225 
2000 260 1,675 0.16 245 
2001 230 1,673 0.14 200 
2002 211 1,654 0.13 198 
2003 203 1,671 0.12 186 
2004 198 1,673 0.12 179 
2005 188 1,623 0.12 184 
2006 182 1,516 0.12 175 
2007 172 1,393 0.12 165 
2008 166 1,332 0.12 146 
2009 161 1,288 0.13 153 
2010 162 1,255 0.13 148 
2011 159 1,200 0.13 145 
 
    
Total 3,865 30,290 0.13 3,430 
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Table 1.2: Univariate test between dual-class and single-class firms 
 
This table reports the difference in the number of segments and volatility and cross-
segment correlation in Tobin’s Q, cash flow, and earnings between dual-class and single-
class firms.  Additionally, the last column shows differences between dual-class and 
propensity-matched single-class firms. We calculate the difference in each year and then 
report the average difference over time and the associated t-values based on Newey-West 
standard errors with one year lag. Asterisks indicate significance at the 0.01(***), 0.05(**), 
and 0.01(*) levels. All variables are described in detail in the appendix.     
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Dual- and single- class firms 
 
Dual- and propensity-matched single-class firms 
    
 Dual-class 
firms 
Single-class 
firms 
Difference 
(1) 
 Dual-class 
firms 
Single-class 
firms 
Difference 
(2) 
        
Number of 
segments 
1.115 1.209 -0.094*** 
 
1.115 1.234 -0.119*** 
   [-8.81]    [-7.18] 
Q 
correlation 
0.989 0.984 0.005*** 
 
0.989 0.985 0.004* 
   [3.14]    [1.93] 
Q  
volatility 
0.588 0.497 0.090*** 
 
0.588 0.454 0.134*** 
   [13.26] 
   [14.35] 
Cash flow 
correlation 
0.988 0.981 0.007*** 
 
0.988 0.980 0.008*** 
   [4.32] 
   [3.32] 
Cash flow 
volatility 
0.241 0.150 0.090*** 
 
0.241 0.153 0.088** 
   [3.44] 
   [2.02] 
Earnings 
correlation 
0.985 0.978 0.007*** 
 
0.985 0.974 0.011*** 
   [3.82]    [3.17] 
Earnings 
volatility 
6.225 2.213 4.011*** 
 
6.225 2.649 3.576*** 
   [26.69] 
   [10.87] 
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Table 1.3: Summary statistics 
 
This table compares firm characteristics between dual-class and single-class firms for 1994 
to 2011. Dollar values are expressed in 2007 dollars. Variables are measured at the end of 
the fiscal year. Total assets is the fiscal year-end total assets. Firm size is calculated by 
multiplying the shares outstanding by the closing price at the end of fiscal year. 
StockReturn is the cumulative stock return over the last 12 months. Leverage is the ratio of 
book value of total debt to book value of total assets. Turnover is the average of monthly 
ratios of the number of shares traded to the number of shares outstanding during the last 
12 months. Return on assets (ROA) is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation, and amortization to the book value of total assets. Dividend equals 1 if the 
firm pays dividends and 0 otherwise. In tests for differences, we first calculate the 
difference each year and then report the average over time and the associated t-values based 
on Newey-West standard errors with one year lag. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. All variables are described in 
detail in the appendix. 
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 Dual- and single-class firms Dual- and propensity-matched single-class firms 
       
 
Dual-class 
firms 
Single-class 
firms 
Difference 
(1) 
Dual-class 
firms 
Single-class 
firms 
Difference 
(2) 
       
Total assets 1,303.783 851.226 452.557*** 1,177.834 997.190 180.644** 
(millions of dollars)       
Size 1,250.927 855.627 395.300*** 1,121.883 950.443 171.441** 
(millions of dollars)       
Book-to-market 0.737 0.720 0.017*** 0.748 0.733 0.014 
 
   
   
Stock return 0.184 0.179 0.005 0.179 0.187 -0.008 
       
Leverage 0.281 0.249 0.033*** 0.250 0.254 -0.004 
       
Dividends 0.516 0.339 0.176*** 0.504 0.365 0.139** 
(dummy) 
      
Turnover 0.116 0.233 -0.117*** 0.121 0.232 -0.111* 
       
Number of 
shareholders 
7.629 31.378 -23.749*** 6.617 44.632 -38.015* 
(thousands) 
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Table 1.4: Regression analyses on dual-class firms 
 
This table shows regression results of the number of segments and correlation and volatility 
in Tobin’s Q, cash flow, and earnings on dual class share and company characteristics. 
Panel A and B include dual-class and all single-class firms and dual-class and propensity-
matched single class firms, respectively. The number of segments for each firm is the 
number of business segments from Compustat’s industry segment files for 1994 to 2011. 
Volatility is the volatility of firm-level Q, cash flow, and earnings over the past 10 years 
(Duchin, 2010). Correlation is a sales-weighted portfolio correlation in Q, cash flow, and 
earnings for multi-segment firms (Hann et al., 2013).  Each of correlation in Q, cash flow, 
and earnings is one for single-segment firms. Cash flow is the ratio of cash flow to total 
assets and earnings is the earnings per share (EPS) in Compustat. Dual class share is a 
dummy variable equal to one if a firm has a dual class share structure and zero otherwise. 
Each regression includes the year fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered at firm-
year level. Asterisks indicate significance at the 0.01(***), 0.05(**), and 0.01(*) levels. 
All control variables are described in detail in the appendix.       
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Panel A: Dual-class and all single-class firms  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Number 
of 
segments 
Q 
correlation 
Q 
volatility 
Cash flow 
correlation 
Cash flow 
volatility 
Earnings 
correlation 
Earnings 
volatility 
        
Dual class 
share 
-0.119*** 0.008*** 0.139*** 0.010*** 0.119*** 0.010** 3.672*** 
(dummy) [-4.60] [2.65] [12.34] [2.91] [5.05] [2.48] [5.60] 
ln(Firm size) 0.024*** -0.001** -0.012*** -0.001** -0.021*** -0.002** 0.480*** 
 
[4.52] [-2.41] [-4.04] [-2.17] [-3.27] [-2.23] [8.40] 
Book-to-
market 
-0.109*** 0.007*** -0.419*** 0.010*** -0.076 0.007** 2.010*** 
 
[-4.36] [3.05] [-20.49] [3.99] [-1.64] [2.06] [5.34] 
Leverage -0.049** 0.003 -0.139*** 0.005* 0.045 0.004 1.683*** 
 
[-2.22] [1.35] [-4.91] [1.78] [1.18] [1.54] [3.70] 
Dividends 0.008 -0.005** -0.134*** -0.003* -0.045** -0.004* -0.180 
(dummy) [0.56] [-2.50] [-11.36] [-1.84] [-2.25] [-1.95] [-0.80] 
Turnover -0.049* 0.010*** 0.037** 0.010*** 0.034 0.009*** 1.463*** 
 
[-1.79] [3.23] [2.05] [2.94] [0.92] [2.66] [3.71] 
Stock returns 0.004 -0.001 0.004 -0.001* -0.006*** -0.001* -0.128** 
 
[0.57] [-1.59] [0.69] [-1.91] [-3.26] [-1.65] [-2.29] 
        
Observations 34,155 34,155 34,155 34,155 34,155 34,155 34,155 
Adjusted 
R-squared 
0.023 0.012 0.178 0.015 0.004 0.014 0.037 
Intercept/ 
Year fixed 
effect 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Year 
Firm & 
Year 
Firm & 
Year 
Firm & 
Year 
Firm & 
Year 
Firm & 
Year 
Firm & 
Year 
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Panel B: Dual-class and propensity-matched single-class firms 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Number 
of 
segments 
Q 
correlation 
Q 
volatility 
Cash flow 
correlation 
Cash flow 
volatility 
Earnings 
correlation 
Earnings 
volatility 
        
Dual class 
share 
-0.109*** 0.008*** 0.147*** 0.011*** 0.084* 0.012** 2.963*** 
(dummy) [-3.47] [3.46] [9.58] [4.38] [1.80] [2.29] [5.84] 
ln(Firm size) 0.025*** -0.002*** -0.007 -0.002** -0.013 -0.002 0.541*** 
 
[2.67] [-3.00] [-1.55] [-2.29] [-0.91] [-1.01] [3.47] 
Book-to-
market 
-0.060* 0.000 -0.267*** 0.001 -0.098 -0.000 1.855** 
 
[-1.69] [0.14] [-11.15] [0.32] [-1.08] [-0.01] [2.42] 
Leverage -0.037 0.001 -0.162*** 0.002 0.056 0.009 3.028*** 
 
[-0.90] [0.35] [-7.03] [0.58] [0.52] [1.08] [2.83] 
Dividends 0.001 -0.001 -0.097*** 0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.132 
(dummy) [0.06] [-0.34] [-9.26] [0.43] [0.03] [0.30] [-0.34] 
Turnover 0.010 0.009** 0.015 0.008* 0.043 0.007 0.953 
 
[0.15] [2.03] [0.75] [1.93] [0.64] [1.13] [1.37] 
Stock returns 0.010 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 -0.130 
 
[1.40] [-1.28] [-0.17] [-1.62] [-0.95] [-1.42] [-1.39] 
        
Observations 6,860 6,860 6,860 6,860 6,860 6,860 6,860 
Adjusted 
R-squared 
0.025 0.010 0.170 0.012 0.003 0.013 0.033 
Intercept/ 
Year fixed 
effect 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Year 
Firm 
&Year 
Firm 
&Year 
Firm & 
Year 
Firm & 
Year 
Firm & 
Year 
Firm 
&Year 
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Table 1.5: Regression analyses on wedge between insiders’ voting rights and cash flow 
rights 
 
This table shows regressions of the number of segments and correlation and volatility in 
Q, cash flow, and earnings on dual-class firms’ wedges in voting rights and cash flow 
rights. The wedge variable (VOratio) is the ratio of the percentage of insiders’ voting rights 
to the percentage of insiders’ cash flow rights at dual-class firms (Harvey et al., 2004; 
Masulis et al., 2009). The number of segments for each firm is the number of business 
segments from Compustat’s industry segment files for 1994 to 2011. Volatility is the 
volatility of firm-level Q, cash flow, and earnings over the past 10 years (Duchin, 2010). 
Correlation is a sales-weighted portfolio correlation in Q, cash flow, and earnings for multi-
segment firms (Hann et al., 2013).  Each of correlation in Q, cash flow, and earnings is one 
for single-segment firms. Cash flow is the ratio of cash flow to total assets and earnings is 
the earnings per share (EPS) in Compustat. Each regression includes the year fixed effects 
and the standard errors are clustered at firm-year level. Asterisks indicate significance at 
the 0.01(***), 0.05(**), and 0.01(*) levels. All control variables are described in detail in 
the appendix.    
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Number 
of 
segments 
Q 
correlation 
Q 
volatility 
Cash flow 
correlation 
Cash flow 
volatility 
Earnings 
correlation 
Earnings 
volatility 
        
VOratio -0.026*** 0.002*** 0.040** 0.002*** 0.037** 0.003*** 0.473** 
 
[-3.45] [2.95] [2.04] [2.63] [2.07] [3.70] [2.35] 
ln(Firm size) 0.037*** -0.004*** 0.009* -0.004*** 0.003 -0.005*** 1.073*** 
 
[3.32] [-2.71] [1.86] [-2.63] [1.02] [-2.66] [2.81] 
Book-to-
market 
0.025 -0.003 
-
0.103*** 
-0.005 -0.030* -0.003 2.415 
 
[0.40] [-0.68] [-4.80] [-1.01] [-1.91] [-0.46] [1.15] 
Leverage -0.029 0.001 
-
0.096*** 
0.000 0.008 -0.004 4.171 
 
[-0.50] [0.23] [-3.69] [0.04] [0.44] [-0.46] [1.50] 
Dividends -0.001 -0.001 
-
0.038*** 
0.002 -0.021* -0.002 -1.312* 
(dummy) [-0.02] [-0.39] [-2.92] [0.40] [-1.82] [-0.51] [-1.66] 
Turnover 0.088 0.009 0.003 0.008 0.004 0.011 0.995 
 
[1.53] [1.19] [0.13] [1.12] [0.33] [1.19] [0.72] 
Stock returns 0.007 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 -0.213 
 
[0.99] [-1.32] [1.08] [-1.20] [0.78] [-1.26] [-1.37] 
        
Observations 3,865 3,865 3,865 3,865 3,865 3,865 3,865 
Adjusted 
R-squared 
0.011 0.022 0.081 0.018 0.034 0.021 0.011 
Intercept/ 
Year fixed 
effect 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Year 
Firm & 
Year 
Firm & 
Year 
Firm & 
Year 
Firm & 
Year 
Firm & 
Year 
Firm & 
Year 
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Table 1.6: Distribution of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) by year  
 
This table reports the distribution of the number of M&As by year for the period 1994 to 
2011. The M&As sample consists of all completed mergers by U.S. public companies 
recorded in the SDC Mergers and Acquisition database between January 1994 to December 
2011. Panel A and B include dual-class and all single-class firms and dual-class and 
propensity-matched single-class firms, respectively. Specifically, each firm’s M&A is 
classified as nondiversifying and diversifying M&As. Nondiversifying M&As are when an 
acquiring and a target firm are in the same industry based on 4-digit SIC code. If a target 
and an acquiring firm’s 4-digit SIC codes are different, then it is defined as diversifying 
M&As.  
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Panel A: Dual-class and all single-class firms 
 
 Dual-class firms  Single-class firms 
    
Year 
Number of 
M&As 
Nondiversifying 
M&As 
% 
Diversifying 
M&As 
%  
Number of 
M&As 
Nondiversifying 
M&As 
% 
Diversifying 
M&As 
% 
            
1994 16 12 0.75 4 0.25  303 156 0.51 147 0.49 
1995 34 24 0.71 10 0.29  425 246 0.58 179 0.42 
1996 48 39 0.81 9 0.19  612 308 0.50 304 0.50 
1997 54 36 0.67 18 0.33  718 370 0.52 348 0.48 
1998 63 46 0.73 17 0.27  842 411 0.49 431 0.51 
1999 67 41 0.61 26 0.39  782 391 0.50 391 0.50 
2000 57 42 0.74 15 0.26  777 389 0.50 388 0.50 
2001 38 28 0.74 10 0.26  510 248 0.49 262 0.51 
2002 45 31 0.69 14 0.31  459 250 0.54 209 0.46 
2003 30 22 0.73 8 0.27  423 215 0.51 208 0.49 
2004 35 21 0.60 14 0.40  500 266 0.53 234 0.47 
2005 42 21 0.50 21 0.50  491 235 0.48 256 0.52 
2006 31 16 0.52 15 0.48  551 286 0.52 265 0.48 
2007 27 17 0.63 10 0.37  577 286 0.50 291 0.50 
2008 26 19 0.73 7 0.27  407 227 0.56 180 0.44 
2009 14 8 0.57 6 0.43  236 135 0.57 101 0.43 
2010 15 12 0.80 3 0.20  346 184 0.53 162 0.47 
2011 22 10 0.45 12 0.55  384 181 0.47 203 0.53 
            
Total 664 445 0.67 219 0.33  9343 4784 0.51 4559 0.49 
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Panel B: Dual-class and propensity-matched single-class firms 
 
 Dual-class firms  Propensity-matched single-class firms 
    
Year 
Number of 
M&As 
Nondiversifying 
M&As 
% 
Diversifying 
M&As 
%  
Number of 
M&As 
Nondiversifying 
M&As 
% 
Diversifying 
M&As 
% 
            
1994 15 11 0.73 4 0.27  17 6 0.35 11 0.65 
1995 27 19 0.70 8 0.30  13 9 0.69 4 0.31 
1996 39 31 0.79 8 0.21  24 15 0.63 9 0.38 
1997 43 27 0.63 16 0.37  48 24 0.50 24 0.50 
1998 40 26 0.65 14 0.35  38 18 0.47 20 0.53 
1999 58 34 0.59 24 0.41  30 12 0.40 18 0.60 
2000 37 26 0.70 11 0.30  33 6 0.18 27 0.82 
2001 25 17 0.68 8 0.32  28 18 0.64 10 0.36 
2002 38 25 0.66 13 0.34  14 7 0.50 7 0.50 
2003 23 15 0.65 8 0.35  16 7 0.44 9 0.56 
2004 23 13 0.57 10 0.43  11 9 0.82 2 0.18 
2005 35 16 0.46 19 0.54  26 8 0.31 18 0.69 
2006 26 11 0.42 15 0.58  14 5 0.36 9 0.64 
2007 20 13 0.65 7 0.35  13 8 0.62 5 0.38 
2008 24 17 0.71 7 0.29  14 9 0.64 5 0.36 
2009 11 6 0.55 5 0.45  6 4 0.67 2 0.33 
2010 15 12 0.80 3 0.20  17 8 0.47 9 0.53 
2011 17 6 0.35 11 0.65  28 14 0.50 14 0.50 
            
Total 516 325 0.63 191 0.37  390 187 0.48 203 0.52 
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Table 1.7: Univariate tests of the probability of M&As in a given year 
 
This table compares the probability of M&As, diversifying M&As, and nondiversifying 
M&As in a given year between dual-class and all single-class firms. Specifically, the 
probability of M&As is the ratio of the total number of M&A activities to the total number 
of firms in a given year based on either dual-class or single-class firms.  In addition, the 
probability of nondiversifying M&As is the total number of nondiversifying M&As to the 
total number of M&As in a given year. Diversifying and nondiversifying M&As are 
classified based on acquiring and target firms’ 4, 3, and 2-digit SIC codes. The M&As 
sample consists of all completed mergers by U.S. public companies recorded in the SDC 
Mergers and Acquisition database between January 1994 to December 2011. We calculate 
the difference in each year and then report the average difference over time and the 
associated t-values based on Newey-West standard errors with one year lag. Statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
All variables are described in detail in the appendix. 
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 Dual- and single- class firms  Dual- and propensity-matched single-class firms 
 Dual-class 
firms 
Single-class 
firms 
Difference 
(1) 
 Dual-class 
firms 
Single-class 
firms 
Difference 
(2) 
        
Probability of M&As 
in a given year 
0.115 0.072 0.043*** 
 
0.107 0.087 0.021** 
   [7.05]    [2.31] 
Probability of  
nondiversifying 
M&As      
 (4 digit SIC) 
0.473 0.343 0.130*** 
 
0.427 0.345 0.082** 
   [3.57]    [2.27] 
Probability of   
diversifying M&As       
(4 digit SIC) 
0.527 0.657 -0.130*** 
 
0.573 0.655 -0.082** 
   [-3.57]    [-2.27] 
Probability of  
nondiversifying 
M&As                     
(3 digit SIC) 
0.672 0.55 0.123*** 
 
0.641 0.538 0.103*** 
   [5.22]    [2.68] 
Probability of   
diversifying M&As  
(3 digit SIC) 
0.328 0.450 -0.123*** 
 
0.359 0.462 -0.103*** 
   [-5.22]    [-2.68] 
Probability of  
nondiversifying 
M&As                      
(2 digit SIC) 
0.783 0.670 0.114***  0.767 0.684 0.073** 
   [5.32]    [1.96] 
Probability of   
diversifying M&As         
 (2 digit SIC) 
0.216 0.330 -0.114***  0.233 0.306 -0.073** 
   [-5.32]    [-1.96] 
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Table 1.8: Logit regression analysis of M&As on dual- and single-class firms  
 
This table reports coefficients from logit models of firms’ M&As. The M&As sample 
consists of all completed mergers by U.S. public companies recorded in the SDC Mergers 
and Acquisition database between January 1994 to December 2011. Dependent variable 
equals to one if a firm completed M&As, has diversifying or nondiversifying M&As. 
Specifically, diversifying and nondiversifying M&As are classified based on acquiring and 
target firms’ 4-digit SIC code. Each regression includes the year fixed effects and Z-scores 
clustered at firm-year level are in brackets. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. All control variables are described in 
detail in the appendix. 
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 Dual- and single- class firms Dual- and propensity-matched single-class firms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
M&A = 1 
Nondiversifying 
M&A = 1 
Diversifying 
M&A = 1 
M&A = 1 
Nondiversifying 
M&A = 1 
Diversifying 
M&A = 1 
  
      
Dual class 
share 
0.285** 0.196** -0.395*** 0.308** 0.270** -0.318** 
(dummy) [2.00] [1.97] [-3.54] [2.15] [2.02] [-2.44] 
ln(Firm size) 0.855*** 0.603*** 0.600*** 0.504*** 0.620*** 0.461*** 
 
[20.61] [33.26] [38.24] [15.78] [13.18] [9.12] 
Book-to-
market 
-0.109 -0.100 0.140 -0.076 -0.117 -0.262 
 
[-0.59] [-1.08] [1.39] [-0.43] [-0.60] [-1.45] 
Leverage -0.224 -0.432*** -0.364** -0.039 0.001 -0.447* 
 
[-1.00] [-2.68] [-2.22] [-0.25] [0.20] [-1.73] 
Dividends -0.390*** -0.395*** -0.161*** -0.086 -0.230* 0.088 
(dummy) [-4.99] [-6.35] [-2.91] [-0.75] [-1.86] [0.58] 
Turnover -0.002 -0.096 -0.872*** -0.076 0.314** -0.670* 
 
[-0.22] [-0.68] [-4.18] [-0.23] [2.28] [-1.78] 
Stock returns -0.058 -0.001 -0.038 -0.057 -0.033 -0.055 
 
[-0.52] [-1.57] [-0.75] [-1.61] [-0.67] [-0.67] 
       
Observations 34,155 34,155 34,155 6,714 6,714 6,714 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.168 0.130 0.132 0.092 0.101 0.085 
Intercept/ 
Year fixed 
effect 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster 
Firm & 
Year 
Firm &  
Year 
Firm &  
Year 
Firm & 
Year 
Firm &  
Year 
Firm &  
Year 
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Table 1.9: Univariate tests of differences in risk-taking propensity around M&As 
 
This table shows changes in the number of segments, correlation, and volatility in Q, cash 
flow, and earnings around firms’ M&As. Specifically, this analysis only includes dual-
class and single-class firms that completed M&As from 1994 to 2011. We define all 
changes in the table as differences between the average number of segments, correlation 
and volatility in Q, cash flow and earnings in eight quarters (i.e. two years) before and after 
M&As. Cash flow is the ratio of cash flow to total assets and earnings is the earnings per 
share (EPS) in Compustat. t-statistics are given in brackets. Statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. All variables are 
described in detail in the appendix.         
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 Dual- and single- class firms  Dual- and propensity-matched single-class firms 
    
 Dual-class 
firms 
single-class 
firms 
Difference 
(1) 
 Dual-class 
firms 
Single-class 
firms 
Difference 
(2) 
        
Δ  Number 
of Segments 
0.091 0.304 -0.214*** 
 
0.133 0.322 -0.189*** 
   [-5.27]    [-2.69] 
Δ  Q 
correlation 
0.000 -0.010 0.010*** 
 
-0.003 -0.008 0.005** 
   [3.20]    [1.96] 
Δ  Q 
volatility 
0.037 -0.088 0.125*** 
 
0.030 -0.089 0.119*** 
   [6.67]    [4.94] 
Δ  Cash flow 
correlation 
0.001 -0.010 0.011*** 
 
0.002 -0.007 0.009* 
   [3.81]    [1.72] 
Δ  Cash flow 
volatility 
0.043 -0.015 0.058* 
 
0.042 0.001 0.042*** 
   [1.85]    [5.66] 
Δ  Earnings 
correlation 
-0.002 -0.011 0.009*** 
 
0.004 0.003 0.001** 
   [2.78]    [2.28] 
Δ  Earnings 
volatility 
23.368 3.139 20.229** 
 
23.526 -27.805 51.332** 
   [1.98]    [1.97] 
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Table 1.10: Regression analyses explaining changes in risk-taking propensity around 
M&As 
 
This table reports regression results of the effect of dual-class on changes in the number of 
segments and correlation and volatility in Q, cash flow and earnings. Specifically, this 
analysis only includes dual-class and single-class firms that completed M&As from 1994 
to 2011. Panel A and B consist of dual-class and single-class firms and dual-class and 
propensity-matched single-class firms, respectively. We define all changes in the table as 
differences between the average number of segments, correlation and volatility in Q, cash 
flow and earnings in eight quarters (i.e. two years) before and after M&As. Cash flow is 
the ratio of cash flow to total assets and earnings is the earnings per share (EPS) in 
Compustat. Control variables are obtained from the previous fiscal year-end of M&A year. 
The t-values used for significance tests are based on robust standard errors and are in 
brackets. Asterisks indicate significance at the 0.01(***), 0.05(**), and 0.01(*) levels. All 
control variables are described in detail in the appendix.     
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Panel A: Dual-class and all single-class firms 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Δ Number of 
segments 
Δ  Q 
correlation 
Δ  Q 
volatility 
Δ  Cash flow 
correlation 
Δ  Cash flow 
volatility 
Δ  Earnings 
correlation 
Δ  Earnings 
volatility 
 
       
Dual class share -0.236*** 0.010*** 0.086*** 0.012*** 0.040*** 0.009** 19.948* 
(dummy) [-5.93] [3.10] [7.83] [3.77] [5.41] [2.42] [1.91] 
ln(Firm size) 0.006 -0.001 0.023*** -0.000 0.052 0.000 -3.766 
 [0.77] [-1.16] [4.46] [-0.77] [0.95] [0.32] [-0.58] 
Book-to-market -0.054 0.001 0.005 -0.002 0.196 -0.000 -2.552 
 [-1.32] [0.30] [0.22] [-0.86] [0.93] [-0.02] [-0.09] 
Leverage 0.154*** -0.001 0.101*** -0.003 -0.417 -0.002 -35.124 
 [3.56] [-0.35] [3.50] [-0.89] [-0.92] [-0.82] [-0.99] 
Dividends 0.020 0.003** 0.052*** -0.001 0.002 -0.001 31.339** 
(dummy) [0.97] [2.09] [5.76] [-0.53] [0.27] [-0.38] [2.13] 
Turnover -0.151*** 0.005* -0.181*** 0.002 -0.148 -0.002 -16.787 
 [-3.66] [1.76] [-4.79] [0.52] [-0.90] [-0.80] [-0.69] 
Stock returns -0.003 0.001 0.052*** 0.001* -0.005 -0.000 -3.324 
 [-0.44] [1.00] [2.61] [1.77] [-1.45] [-0.28] [-0.95] 
Relative size -0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.009*** 
 [-2.74] [0.93] [3.23] [0.14] [-0.93] [0.23] [-18.27] 
Stock M&A 0.001 -0.000 -0.044** 0.000 -0.127 0.003 -4.530 
 [0.05] [-0.09] [-2.27] [0.02] [-0.99] [1.25] [-0.23] 
Cash M&A -0.043** -0.000 -0.006 -0.003* -0.022 0.001 -4.936 
 [-1.98] [-0.27] [-0.71] [-1.88] [-0.97] [0.35] [-0.28] 
        
Observations 6,403 6,403 6,403 6,403 6,403 6,403 6,403 
Intercept YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.009 0.003 0.064 0.004 0.008 0.002 0.001 
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Panel B: Dual-class and propensity-matched single-class firms 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Δ  Number of 
segments 
Δ  Q 
correlation 
Δ  Q 
volatility 
Δ  Cash flow 
correlation 
Δ  Cash flow 
volatility 
Δ  Earnings 
correlation 
Δ  Earnings 
volatility 
  
       
Dual class share -0.227*** 0.005** 0.097*** 0.009* 0.044*** 0.012** 42.093* 
(dummy) [-3.09] [2.00] [4.33] [1.77] [5.64] [2.33] [1.73] 
ln(Firm size) 0.072** -0.002 0.020** 0.000 -0.001 0.001 3.112 
 [2.07] [-0.85] [1.97] [0.12] [-0.24] [0.90] [0.55] 
Book-to-market 0.168 -0.006 0.051 0.005 0.022 0.013* -118.856* 
 [0.99] [-0.82] [0.94] [0.69] [1.35] [1.83] [-1.71] 
Leverage -0.057 0.012 0.107* -0.014** -0.023 -0.005 -61.096 
 [-0.44] [1.49] [1.92] [-2.34] [-1.20] [-0.88] [-0.65] 
Dividends -0.064 0.001 0.049** 0.002 0.000 -0.009* 28.691* 
(dummy) [-0.85] [0.16] [1.99] [0.35] [0.07] [-1.88] [1.65] 
Turnover -0.429** 0.015 -0.120 0.001 0.047 0.003 -274.818 
 [-2.57] [1.45] [-1.08] [0.08] [1.32] [0.31] [-1.56] 
Stock returns -0.014 0.002 0.076*** -0.001 -0.017*** 0.001 8.367 
 [-0.35] [0.64] [3.50] [-0.22] [-3.28] [0.55] [0.84] 
Relative size -0.000*** 0.000 0.000* -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.010*** 
 [-2.66] [0.82] [1.71] [-0.60] [0.10] [-1.29] [-22.87] 
Stock M&A 0.084 -0.005 -0.020 0.006 0.000 0.002 12.477 
 [0.47] [-0.96] [-0.35] [0.92] [0.00] [0.19] [0.45] 
Cash M&A 0.004 0.008 0.028 0.005 -0.002 -0.003 -32.653 
 [0.06] [1.36] [1.37] [0.86] [-0.25] [-0.51] [-1.07] 
        
Observations 524 524 524 524 524 524 524 
Intercept YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.030 0.009 0.125 0.010 0.091 0.019 0.057 
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Chapter Two: CEO Appointment in Corporate Spin-Offs 
1. Introduction 
Many studies show that different CEO styles or characteristics affect corporate 
decisions and performance.  Our study provides new evidence on the topic.  Specifically, 
using a sample of spin-offs, we look at how CEOs with certain expertise affect shareholder 
wealth and operating performance. If CEOs with financial expertise are appointed at the 
spun-off units, there are positive abnormal announcement returns, higher amounts of 
external financing and better operating performance after spin-offs.      
Spin-offs are unique events that provide many opportunities to examine corporate 
finance issues such as a firm’s investment policy and restructuring of the firm’s assets.   
The majority of spin-off studies focus on the consequences of spin-offs in which a firm 
separates one or more of its subsidiary(s), creating a publicly traded firm.  For instance, 
since a conglomerate’s diversification discount is attributable to its inefficient investment 
policies, refocusing through spin-offs significantly increases the firm's investment 
efficiency (Ahn and Denis, 2004; Burch and Nanda, 2003; Ahn and Walker, 2007).   
 However, we still know very little about how corporate governance structure changes 
around spinoff transactions. In practice, existing firms (referred to as parent firms) 
determine large aspects of the spin-off dynamic, such as signaling which unit will be spun 
off, and the selection of the unit’s management team (Wachtell et al., 2013).  In most spin-
offs, parent firms choose one of their executives or promote a division manager as the spun-
off unit’s CEO4.  We hereafter refer to these as parent firm CEOs and division CEOs, 
                                                          
4 Wruck and Wruck (2002) classified the CEOs of spun-off units as insiders and outsiders.  The insiders are 
spun-off unit CEOs with long tenure at parent firms and the outsiders are spun-off unit CEOs hired as 
executives at parent firm fewer than three years before the spin-off announcement.  In our sample, we only 
have eight outsiders based on Wruck and Wruck (2002) classification and their average tenure at parent firm 
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respectively.  Wruck and Wruck (2002) study the cross-sectional variation in terms of 
restructuring top management at spun-off units.  Specifically, they find that when one of 
the parent firm’s executives is assigned as top management of the spun-off unit, there is a 
significant wealth effect at the spin-off announcement.  They explain that this occurs 
because executives at parent firms might be governance experts or perhaps possess more 
management experience compared to division heads.  
However, it is still not clear what kind of expertise is related to the value creation of 
spin-offs if they have any.  On the other hand, it is also possible that parent firms search 
for specific expertise for spun-off unit CEO candidates regardless of whether they are 
parent executives or division heads.  So, in this study, we investigate corporate spin-offs in 
terms of changes in governance structure, specifically, in the selection of CEOs at          
spun-off units. 
A variety of studies show that one of the most important reasons of spin-offs is to 
enhance accessibility to capital markets following spin-offs in order to accelerate spun-off 
units’ growth opportunities.  For example, Krishnaswami and Subramaniam 
(1999) empirically show that since spin-offs mitigate information asymmetry, a firm with 
weak cash flow is more likely to engage in a spin-off if its subsidiary has potential         
stand-alone growth opportunities.  Thus, we hypothesize that parent firms prefer to assign 
CEOs with financial expertise at spun-off units if firms in need of external financing are 
more likely to engage in spin-offs.   
                                                          
is 2.86 years before the spin-off announcement.  Since we are interested in rationale for parent firms’ choice 
between parent firm CEOs and division CEOs, we classified these outsiders as parent firm CEOs in our 
sample.   
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In other words, we believe that spun-off unit CEOs with financial expertise can better 
utilize an in-depth understanding of external capital market resources compared to those 
without such financial expertise. Accordingly, we predict that shareholders’ wealth 
significantly increase when parent firms appoint CEOs with financial expertise at spun-off 
units.  This is affirmed by Miles and Rosenfeld (1983) who suggest that a spin-off 
announcement should result in a positive market reaction if investors expect increased 
future cash flows through the firm’s divestiture.  At the same time, we expect to see 
significantly increased external financing activities for firms with spun-off unit CEOs with 
financial expertise following the spin-off. 
We find that the choice of spun-off unit CEOs explains a great deal of cross-sectional 
variation in the stock market reaction to spin-off announcements and operating 
performance, especially when CEOs with financial expertise are appointed at spun-off 
units.  For instance, the stock market reaction to the spin-off announcement is significantly 
greater when financial experts are appointed at spun-off units as CEOs. Additionally,        
the considerable growth in external financing following spin-offs is mostly attributable to 
firms with spun-off unit CEOs possessing financial expertise. Consequently, the post-
spinoff firm’s operating performance significantly improves for firms with spun-off unit 
CEOs with financial expertise.  When CEOs with non-financial expertise are chosen 
regardless of their position at parent firms, we observe zero or negligible stock price 
reaction at the spin-off announcement, and detect no significant changes in external 
financing activities or operating performance following spin-offs. 
Our study contributes to the growing literature on CEOs’ skills and their impact on 
operating performance.  Using a sample of spin-offs, the evidence shows that CEOs with 
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financial expertise appear to improve firms’ accessibility to external capital markets and 
consequently, enhance operating performance. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 and 3 describe our data 
and report descriptive statistics.  In section 4, we examine stock market reaction to spin-
off announcement and post-transaction changes in external financing activities and 
operating performance based on spun-off unit CEOs with financial expertise.  Section 5 
concludes the study.  
 
2. Data collection and sample formation 
Our sample consists of 109 completed spin-offs between 1994 and 2009.  The initial 
431 spin-off samples are drawn from the Security Data Corporation (SDC)’s Merger and 
Acquisition database on spin-offs taking place between 1994 and 2009.  Based on the deal 
synopsis from SDC, we exclude transactions from the initial sample if (a) it occurred as a 
result of parent firm’s lawsuit or acquisition by another firm, (b) the spin-off occurred 
because of parent firm’s merging with another firm or (c) either the parent firm or the spun-
off unit was acquired by or merged with another firm in the year after the spin-off.  After 
this procedure, we have 244 spin-off samples.   
Of the 244 samples, we retain observations satisfying the following criteria.  First, 
we include all successfully completed spin-offs in the United States.  Second, we require 
the spin-offs to make a 100% distribution of the unit’s stock to shareholders (i.e. the non-
taxable spin-offs) to ensure that the spun-off unit is an independent firm.  Third, we restrict 
the sample to firms having at least two years of financial data on COMPUSTAT and stock 
price information on CRSP before spin-offs for parent firms and after spin-offs for both 
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parent firms and spun-off units.  Fourth, we retain 29 spin-offs in which the spun-off units 
are publicly traded at the time of spin-off announcement and exclude 13 deals involving 
carve-outs over the sample period.  Additionally, we require parent firms and both the 
resulting parent firms and spun-off units to issue a proxy statement available in the year 
preceding the spin-off announcement and in the year succeeding the spin-off execution, 
respectively.  Lastly, we exclude spun-off units operating in financial services and utilities 
(SIC 4900-4999, 6000-6999).  This selection process leaves us with 109 spin-offs during 
the sample period.  The number of our spin-off samples is similar to other recent studies in 
spin-offs.  For example, Denis et al. (2012) have 93 spin-off samples from 1994 to 2003 
and the number of our spin-offs is 95 during their aforementioned sample period.      
In order to control for firm-specific characteristics in our analysis, we identify each 
parent firm’s and spun-off unit’s control firm from a universe of COMPUSTAT after 
excluding parent firms and spun-off units in our sample.  Specifically, we identify parent 
firms’ matching groups by applying the propensity score matching based on firm 
characteristics in the year preceding the spin-off announcement: the 48 Fama and French 
industry classifications (1997; hereafter FF 48 industry), firm size, firm age, the number of 
segments and other characteristics that are commonly used in spin-off studies .  In order to 
identify matching firms for spun-off unit, we construct the initial pool of matching groups 
consisting of single segment firms.  Additionally, we exclude firms older than five years 
in each year from the initial matching sample group for spun-off units.  This age restriction 
ensures the reasonable maturity of matching firms (Patro, 2008).  Next, we define matching 
firms for spun-off units by applying the propensity score matching based on firm 
characteristics in the year subsequent to the execution of the spin-off.  
 
50 
 
Panel A in Table 2.1 reports a time profile of spin-off announcement and the mean 
(median) segments of parent and matching firms by year.  The number of spin-off 
announcements varies during the sample period: a low of one in 2006 and a high of 17 in 
2000.  Additionally, 87% (95 out of 109) of spin-off announcements occur from 1994 to 
2003.  Untabulated results show that there are no specific industry patterns based on the 
FF 48 industry classification in spin-off decision.  In Panel B, we show the number of spin-
off executions by year during the sample period.  Further, we classify 109 spin-offs based 
on whether the CEOs of spun-off units were one of the parent firm’s executives (i.e. Parent 
firm CEOs) or a former division head (i.e. Division CEOs).  Additionally, each of CEOs 
in the 109 spun-off units is classified as a financial expert if the CEO has served as a 
director on the audit committee or in a financial institution before the spin-off 
announcement or had prior financial industry experience for current or past employment 
in financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) suggested by Fracssi and Tate (2012) and Guner et al. 
(2008).  We check CEOs’ backgrounds based on CEO profiles in the proxy statement of 
parent firms and spun-off units.  Specifically, we classify the following types of parent firm 
CEOs and division CEOs as financial experts: directors serving on audit committees or 
directors of financial institutions in the five years before spin-offs.  We exclude academic 
backgrounds, since Anderson et al. (2004) suggest that it is ambiguous to identify financial 
expertise according to academic background.   
Of the 109 spin-offs, 30 (28%) spun-off units are division CEOs and 79 (72%) 
spun-off units are parent firm CEOs. Wruck and Wruck (2002) classified the CEOs of 
spun-off units as insiders and outsiders.  The insiders are spun-off unit CEOs with long 
tenure at parent firms and the outsiders are spun-off unit CEOs hired as executives at parent 
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firm fewer than three years before the spin-off announcement.  In our sample, we only have 
eight outsiders based on Wruck and Wruck (2002) classification and their average tenure 
at parent firm is 2.86 years before the spin-off announcement, and we classify these 
outsiders as parent firm CEOs in our sample. In addition, 57 spun-off unit CEOs (53%) in 
our 109 spin-off samples are classified as financial experts: 43% of division CEOs (13 out 
of 30) and 56% of parent firm CEOs (44 out of 79).  
 
3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2.2 reports descriptive statistics for the sample firms.  In Panel A of Table 2.2, 
we compare spin-offs to non-spin-offs in terms of firm characteristics.  We find a matching 
non-spin-off firm as a control group for each spin-off firm based on each firms’ 
characteristics.  Appendix A defines all variables.  Specifically, we estimate the following 
logistic model:  
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑛 − 𝑜𝑓𝑓 = 1)
= ∝0+  𝛽1𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛽2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
+ 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑦 +  𝛽5𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
+ 𝛽6𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 +  𝛽7𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ 𝛽8 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +  𝛽9 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 (𝐹𝐹48) +  𝛽10 𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑛
− 𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡.  
 
Panel B compares parent firm CEOs to division CEOs in terms of their parent firm 
characteristics.  The parent and the matching firms’ information in Table 2.2 are obtained 
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for the fiscal year ending just prior to the spin-off announcement. The spun-off unit’s size 
equals total assets at the first fiscal year subsequent to the execution of spin-off.              
Panel A of Table 2.2 indicates that, on average, spin-off firms and non-spin-off firms 
look quite similar.  Following Dierkens (1991) and Krishnaswami and Subramaniam 
(1999), the information asymmetry is measured as the standard deviation of the three-day 
abnormal returns for all quarterly earnings announcements in the five years preceding the 
spin-off announcement.  The mean (median) R&D intensity is 0.049 (0.000) and 0.041 
(0.000) for spin-off firms and non-spin-off firms, and the difference is not statistically 
significant.  The R&D intensity of spin-off firms is higher than previous studies in spin-
offs.  Specifically, Patro (2008) reports the mean (median) R&D intensity of spin-off firms 
is 0.036(0.000) during the sample period from 1981 to 2000.  The higher R&D intensity in 
our samples from 1994 to 2009 reflects the increase in R&D spending over time in U.S. 
industry (Franzen et al., 2007).  Spin-off firms have slightly higher operating cash flow and 
cash and investment than their matching non-spin-off firms, but the difference is not 
statistically significant.  Ahn and Walker (2007) report that, during their sample period 
from 1981 to 1997, the mean Tobin’s Q of spin-offs and non-spin-offs is 1.857 and 1.616 
and similar to our samples: 1.734 for spin-offs and 1.613 for non-spin-offs.  Board 
characteristics for spin-offs are also quite similar to non-spin-off firms such as board size 
and the portion of outside directors and non-busy director.  Compared to previous studies, 
these numbers are not significantly different.  For example, Coles et al. (2008) show that 
the mean (median) board size is 10.4 (10) and the median fraction of outside directors is 
0.84 during their sample period from 1992 to 2001.  
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In Panel B of Table 2.2, we report the comparison results of firm characteristics 
between parent firm CEOs and division CEOs.  The firm size of parent firm CEOs is 
smaller than that of division CEOs; the mean difference is -60324.30 (= 26586.87 – 
33734.43), while the median difference is 167.31 (=2581.44 – 2748.76), both statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level.  At the same time, parent firm CEOs retain lower cash 
and generate lower operating cash flow than division CEOs.  Relatively small firm size and 
low cash holdings for parent firm CEOs appear to be related to their financial 
constraints.  These results are supported by earlier research on financial constraints that 
defines financially constrained firms as small firms or firms with poor credit ratings 
(Campello et al., 2010).  For board characteristics, parent firm CEOs have a considerably 
higher proportion of outside block ownerships and non-busy directors than division 
CEOs.  For relative size between parent firms and spun-off units, we apply two different 
methods: relative size 1 based on the market value of total assets and relative size 2 based 
on the book value of total assets.  It indicates that two groups have a similar relative           
size 2. 
 
4. Empirical results  
In this section, we investigate whether parent firms appoint spun-off unit CEOs 
with financial expertise in order to maximize the units’ potential growth and improve 
access to capital markets regardless of spun-off unit CEOs’ previous position as parent 
executives or division heads.  Specifically, we examine the stock market reaction to firms’ 
choice between parent firm CEOs and division CEOs, and between financial expert CEOs 
and non-financial experts in section 5-1.  We also investigate changes in external financing 
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activities prior to and following spin-offs between parent firm CEOs and division CEOs, 
and between financial experts CEOs and non-financial experts in later sections. 
4.1. Wealth effect of parent firm CEOs 
Panel A of Table 2.3 reports the abnormal returns on the spin-off announcement for 
full-sample with 109 spin-offs and 109 non-spin-offs.  Our analysis focuses on the 
cumulative three-day announcement returns (i.e. CAR (-1,+1)) starting the day before the 
spin-off announcement.  Additionally, cumulative abnormal returns are adjusted by market 
model, Fama-French three factors and the four factor model.  Previous studies in spin-offs 
report that spin-off announcement abnormal returns are significantly positive, ranging from 
2.6% to 5.8% (Schipper and Smith, 1983; Daley et al., 1997; Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam, 1999; Chemmanur et al., 2010).  In our sample, the average abnormal return 
on the spin-off announcement date is approximately 3.4% and is significantly different 
from zero across all three different return adjustment models.   
  In Panel B of Table 2.4, we investigate the difference of CAR (-1, +1) between 
spin-offs with parent firm CEOs and division CEOs.  When a spin-off firm chooses one of 
its executives as a spun-off unit’s CEO, Panel B indicates that CAR (-1, +1) is around 4% 
and significantly different from zero across all adjusted excess returns.  CAR (-1, +1) for 
spin-offs with division CEOs is around 2% and also significantly different from zero.  At 
the same time, Panel C shows how the market reacts on the announcement of appointing 
financial experts and non-financial experts as CEOs at the spun-off units. On average, there 
are 5% and 1.3% cumulative three-day announcement returns for appointing financial 
expert CEOs and non-financial expert CEOs at spun-off units, respectively, and both of the 
excess returns are statistically significant at the 5 percent or the 10 percent level.  Even 
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though different groups of spun-off unit CEOs in Panel B and C show positive and 
significant abnormal returns on spin-off announcement dates, the difference of CAR (-
1,+1) between financial expert CEOs and non-financial expert CEOs is twice as high as 
the difference of CAR (-1,1) between parent firm CEOs and division CEOs.  These results 
suggest that the positive excess returns to spin-off announcement in Panel A are mostly 
attributable to financial expert CEOs at spun-off units in Panel C.   
However, there are other factors that may affect abnormal returns on spin-off 
announcement, especially when parent firms decide to appoint financial experts as spun-
off unit CEOs. To see if our results of univariate tests in Table 2.3 are driven by factors 
other than the appointment of financial expert CEOs at spun-off units, we perform multiple 
regression to control for these factors.  In Table 2.4, we test that any positive consequence 
associated with the appointment of financial expert CEOs will be most pronounced 
regardless of spun-off unit CEOs’ previous position as parent executives or division heads.  
Table 2.4 presents six different regression models including independent variables for 
parent firm CEOs, division CEOs, and financial expert CEOs and interaction terms 
between parent firm CEOs and financial expert CEOs (i.e. PE × FE) and between division 
CEOs and financial expert CEOs (i.e. DE × FE).  Specifically, two interaction terms (i.e. 
PE × FE and DE × FE) capture the incremental effect of spun-off unit CEOs with financial 
expertise in increasing shareholders’ wealth.  Specifically, we expect to see the positive 
and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction terms between division CEOs and 
financial expert CEOs if the appointment of financial expert CEOs is the most important 
factor affecting positive and significant market reaction to firms’ spin-off announcement.   
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First, positive and significant coefficients on financial expert CEOs across all 
columns in Table 2.4 add support to the univariate tests in Table 2.4 that demonstrate how 
appointing spun-off unit CEOs with financial expertise brings significant positive wealth 
effect.  Moreover, the stock market reaction to appointing division CEOs with financial 
expertise (i.e. DE × FE) is positive and statistically significant at the 5% confidence level 
in column (2), (4), and (6).  These results confirm our findings of univariate tests in Table 
2.4 that the expected benefits of spun-off unit CEOs with financial expertise are 
significantly positive regardless of the CEOs previous position as parent executives or 
division managers.  However, it does not directly support our hypothesis that parent firms 
appoint financial experts as CEOs at spun-off units to increase external funding, to 
maximize investment opportunities, and ultimately to improve operating performance. 
Therefore, in the next sections we investigate how the appointment of spun-off unit CEOs 
with financial expertise affects changes in external financing activities and operating cash 
flows before and after spin-off executions.   
4.2. Abnormal changes in capital raising activities 
Since we believe that spun-off unit CEOs with financial expertise have in-depth 
knowledge of capital markets, we examine, in this section, whether financial expert CEOs 
have better access to capital markets than the different types of spun-off unit CEOs such 
as parent firm CEOs or division CEOs.  Specifically, we look into the dollar amount 
changes in external financing involving spin-offs.  To perform these analyses, we compute 
the combined amount of external financing following spin-offs by adding the net increase 
in external financing of post-parent and spun-off units.  We define the amount of external 
financing of matching non-spin-off firms in a similar way.  
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In Table 2.5, we compare the dollar amounts of external financing5, equity and debt, 
raised by spin-offs to non-spin-offs and parent firm CEOs to division CEOs in Panel A and 
B, respectively.  The last two columns, (5) and (6), in Panel A and B present the changes 
and average two-year changes of external financing prior to and following spin-offs.  
Additionally, Panel C shows the changes in the amount of external financing around spin-
off between financial expert CEOs and non-financial expert CEOs, and concurrently 
between parent firm CEOs and division CEOs.        
First, we apply the univariate test to analyze the changes in external financing 
activities prior to and following spin-offs for a sample of 109 spin-offs and non-spin-offs. 
Panel A of Table 2.6 shows that spin-off firms’ external financing activities are 
significantly increased after spin-offs compared to non-spin-off firms. In the first and 
second year following the transactions, the abnormal amount of capital raised by spin-off 
firms equals $150.97 and $174.99 million dollars and is statistically significant at the 5% 
level.  Specifically, equity financing accounts for 40% of changes in the total abnormal 
financing involving spin-off executions.  This is consistent with the findings of 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) that considerably increased equity financing is 
due to the reduced asymmetric information for spin-off firms.  They explain that the 
reduced asymmetric information helps increase the firm’s share price and eventually makes 
equity financing less costly than before the spin-off (Nanda and Narayanan, 1997).          
Second, we test the difference in external financing between 79 parent firm CEOs 
and 30 division CEOs.  As shown in the difference in Panel B, parent firm CEOs raise 
significantly higher amounts of external financing than division CEOs.  Specifically, 
                                                          
5 In order to measure the amount of net equity and the net debt issued, we follow the methods suggested by 
Hovakimian et al (2001, 2004).   
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column (5) in Panel B indicates that the one-year changes (-1, +1) of abnormal external 
financing raised by parent firm CEOs and division CEOs are $178.55 million and $78.33 
million and statistically significant at the 10% level.  Next, in Panel C, we look closely into 
whether financial expertise has a significant impact on the increased external financing that 
we show in Panel A and B of Table 2.6.  If spun-off unit CEOs with financial expertise 
possess an in-depth understanding of capital markets, we expect that these financial experts 
raise significantly more external financing than non-financial experts in the sample.   
Panel C of Table 2.6 indicates that 55% of parent firm CEOs (44 out of 79) and 
43% of division CEOs (13 out of 30) are classified as financial experts.  The changes in 
one-year and average two-year dollar amounts of raised capital by financial experts are 
significantly higher than non-financial experts by $93.62 million (= $195.63 m – $102.01) 
and by $97.63 million (= $221.09 m – $124.46) and both differences are statistically 
significant at the 5% level.  Moreover, parent firm CEOs with financial expertise raise 
$205.58 million of external financing, significantly higher than the amount of external 
financing raised by parent firm CEOs with non-financial expertise.  
Having financial expertise for division CEOs also makes significant differences in 
external financing activities following spin-off executions.  In two-year average changes 
of abnormal external capital financing, division CEOs with financial expertise raise 
$194.47 million and division CEOs with non-financial expertise only raise $9.97 million.  
These results suggest that even though parent firm CEOs’ non-measurable characteristics 
might improve firms’ accessibility to external capital markets as shown in Panel B, 
financial experts significantly enhance firms’ access to capital markets regardless of spun-
off unit CEOs’ position prior to spin-offs.     
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Lastly, we perform multiple regression of the change in abnormal external 
financing activities around spin-off on parent firm CEOs, division CEOs and financial 
expert CEOs with other control variables.  The results in Table 2.6 also confirm our results 
in Panel C of Table 2.5.  In column (2), (3) and (4) in Panel A and B, the positive and 
statistically significant coefficients on financial experts suggest that considerable amounts 
of external financing are raised by spun-off unit CEOs with financial expertise after spin-
offs.  At the same time, in column (4) in Panels A and B, the coefficients on division CEOs 
with financial expertise (i.e. DM × FE) suggest that financial expertise has positive and 
statistically significant effect on the abnormal changes in external financing regardless of 
spun-off unit CEOs’ previous positions at parent firm prior to spin-offs. These results in 
Table 2.5 and 2.6 are in line with Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) findings that 
firms in need of external financing are more likely to engage in spin-offs.  If all these results 
are driven by proper assumptions and models, we expect to see thereafter significantly 
improved operating performance for spin-off firms with spun-off unit CEOs with financial 
expertise.       
4.3 Abnormal changes in operating cash flows           
In this section, we test how operating performance changes around spin-off transactions 
by looking at different groups of spun-off unit CEOs: parent firm CEOs, division CEOs 
and spun-off unit CEOs with financial expertise.  In Panel A of Table 2.7, we compare the 
abnormal changes in operating cash flows of spin-off firms with non-spin-off firms.  Panel 
B reports the difference in operating cash flows between spin-offs with parent firm CEOs 
and division CEOs prior to and following the transactions. Additionally, Panel C shows 
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changes in operating cash flows between financial experts and non-financial experts and 
between parent firm CEOs and division CEOs at the same time.   
Firm’s performance equals its operating cash flow returns as suggested by other spin-
off studies (Daley et al. (1997); Desai and Jain (1999); Chemmanur et al. 
(2010)).  Specifically, firm’s operating cash flows are measured in two different ways 
suggested by Denis and McKoen (2012) as Operating Cash Flow (1) and Chemmanur et 
al. (2010) as Operating Cash Flow (2) and each firm’s operating cash flow is scaled by its 
total assets.  For this analysis, we construct a hypothetical combined entity (i.e. pro-forma 
firm) that includes a parent firm and its spun-off unit in proportion to year-end market 
value.  Matching non-spin-off firms are also constructed in a similar fashion after defining 
a matching firm for each parent firm and spun-off unit based on propensity matching 
scores.    
Panel A of Table 2.7 shows that spin-off firms’ performance following the transactions 
significantly improved compared to non-spin-off firms.  For instance, abnormal operating 
cash flow returns (1) and (2) for spin-off firms are improved by 0.015 and 0.013 in the one 
year before and after spin-offs, year (-1, +1) and the changes are significantly different 
from zero at the 5% confidence level.  Panel B indicates that even though the differences 
of changes in abnormal cash flow returns between parent firm CEOs and division CEOs 
are statistically significant, abnormal changes in cash flow returns for each of the parent 
firm CEOs and division CEOs are positive and statistically significant.   
On the other hand, Panel C shows that regardless of spun-off unit CEOs’ position prior 
to spin-off, appointing spun-off unit CEOs possessing financial expertise significantly 
improves operating performance after spin-off transactions.  Specifically, even though both 
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spun-off unit CEOs with and without financial expertise show improved post-transaction 
performance, financial experts’ changes in operating cash flow returns (1) and (2)  are 2.22 
(= 0.020/0.009) and 2.10 (=0.021/0.010) times higher than non-financial experts in a one 
year duration, year (-1, +1).  Moreover, the positive changes in operating cash flow returns 
are statistically significant only for spun-off unit CEOs with financial expertise.  
In Table 2.8, the multiple regression results are also consistent with the univariate tests 
in Panel C of Table 2.7.  Specifically, all positive and significant coefficients on financial 
experts (i.e. FE) and on the interaction term between financial expert and division CEOs 
(i.e. DM × FE) in Panel A and B indicate that after controlling for all other factors, 
appointing spun-off unit CEOs with financial expertise has a considerable impact on the 
enhanced spin-off firms’ performance following spin-off regardless of spun-off unit CEOs’ 
previous position at parent firm as executive or division manager. We therefore conclude 
that consistent with our hypothesis, spun-off unit CEOs’ expertise in external capital 
markets is one of most important factors that significantly improve the spin-off firm’s 
performance following spin-off. 
 
5. Conclusion         
In this study, we document that parent firms’ selection of spun-off unit CEOs is 
associated with value created by spin-off announcements and post-transaction changes in 
operating performance based on a sample of 109 spin-offs from 1994 to 2009.  Previous 
studies on spin-offs show that one of the most important reasons for a spin-off is to enhance 
accessibility to capital markets following spin-off in order to accelerate spun-off units’ 
growth opportunities.  Thus, we hypothesize that parent firms prefer to assign CEOs with 
 
62 
 
financial expertise at spun-off units if firms in need of external financing are more likely 
to engage in spin-offs. We find spun-off unit CEOs with financial expertise possess            
in-depth knowledge of capital markets and considerably increase external financing 
activities and improve operating cash flows following the transaction.  
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Table 2.1: Distribution of sample spin-offs by year 
 
This table presents a frequency summary of the sample firms that completed a spin-off 
from 1994 to 2009.  The spin-off data is obtained from SDC platinum.  There are 109 
completed tax-free spin-offs.  Panel A reports the spin-off samples by announcement 
year.  Panel A also reports the number of mean (median) segments before the 
announcement year for spin-off and control firms.  The control firms are defined by the 
propensity score matching based on the 48 Fama and French (1997) industry 
classifications, firm size, firm age, the number of segments, and all other characteristics 
from spin-off literatures.  In Panel B, the spin-off samples are distributed by spin-off 
execution year.  Further, the samples are portioned on the basis of whether the CEOs of 
spun-off unit were parent executives (i.e. Parent firm CEOs) or former division heads      
(i.e. Division CEOs) and whether the parent firm CEOs and division CEOs is a financial 
expert or a non-financial expert.  Specifically, each CEO in the spun-off unit is classified 
as a financial expert if the CEO was a director serving on the audit committee or in a 
financial institution before the spin-off announcement or has financial industry experience 
for current or past employment in financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) suggested by Fracassi 
and Tate (2012) and Guner et al.(2008).  
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Panel A: Distribution of spin-off announcements 
 
 
 Spin-off firms Non spin-off firms 
Year N Percentage of sample Mean (Median) of Segments Mean (Median) of Segments 
     
1994 6 5.5   % 2.6    (2) 2.8   (3) 
1995 12 11.0 % 3.5    (3) 3.2   (3) 
1996 10 9.2  % 3.7    (3) 3.1   (3) 
1997 15 13.8 % 3.6    (3) 3.2   (3) 
1998 11 10.1 % 3.2    (3) 3.3   (3) 
1999 8 7.3  % 4.1    (4) 3.5   (3) 
2000 17 15.6 % 5.9    (5) 4.4   (4) 
2001 5 4.6  % 5.0    (5) 5.5   (6) 
2002 4 3.7  % 4.8    (5) 5.3   (6) 
2003 7 6.4  % 6.6    (7) 7.2   (7) 
2004 3 2.8  % 7.3    (5) 7.3   (5) 
2005 3 2.8  % 7.7    (9) 5.7   (6) 
2006 1 0.9  % 5.0    (5) 6.0   (6) 
2007 5 4.6  % 4.0    (4) 4.8   (4) 
2008 2 1.8  % 5.5    (5) 6 .0  (6) 
Total 109 100 % 4.48    (4) 4.16   (3.8) 
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Panel B: Distribution of spin-off executions 
  
Year N % of sample 
Division 
(Financial expert) CEOs 
Parent firm 
(Financial expert) CEOs 
     
1994 2 1.8  % 2    (1) 0    (0) 
1995 7 6.4  % 2    (2) 5    (3) 
1996 17 15.6 % 6    (2) 11   (7) 
1997 11 10.1 % 1    (0) 10   (7) 
1998 13 11.9 % 5    (2) 8    (4) 
1999 6 5.5  % 1    (0) 5    (2) 
2000 14 12.8 % 2    (0) 12   (8) 
2001 11 10.1 % 2    (1) 9    (2) 
2002 5 4.6  % 1    (1) 4    (0) 
2003 5 4.6  % 0    (0) 5    (5) 
2004 6 5.5  % 2    (0) 4    (2) 
2005 3 2.8  % 2    (2) 1    (0) 
2006 1 0.9  % 0    (0) 1    (1) 
2007 5 4.6  % 2    (1) 3    (2) 
2008 1 0.9  % 0    (0) 1    (1) 
2009 2 1.8  % 2   (1) 0    (0) 
Total 109 100 % 30   (13) 79  (44) 
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics                              
The table presents means and medians of key variables for a sample of 109 spin-offs and 
non-spin-offs in Panel A and 79 parent firm CEOs and 30 division CEOs in Panel B from 
1994 to 2009.  Dollar values are expressed in 2004 dollars.  Accounting and segment data 
are from COMPUSTAT.  Firm board structure and stock ownership by executives, 
directors and institutional investors are obtained from yearly proxy statements.  In Table 
2.2, key variables are taken at the end of the prior fiscal year of the spin-off announcement 
(year -1).  Additionally, in Panel B the spun-off unit’s size is the total assets at the first 
fiscal year subsequent to the execution of spin-off.  Two-sample t-tests (Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney tests) are conducted to compare the difference of means (medians) of 
samples.  Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***,**, and 
*, respectively.  Appendix A defines all variables.  
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Panel A: Comparison of spin-offs and matching firms 
  
Full Sample  
(N = 218) 
  
Spin-off firms  
(N = 109) 
  
Non-spin-off firms   
(N = 109) 
  
 
Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  
 
      
Leverage 0.266 0.257 0.261 0.262 0.271 0.251 
Operating cash flow / Assets 0.136 0.131 0.142 0.137 0.130 0.131  
Cash & Investment / Assets 0.159 0.114 0.165 0.114 0.154 0.114 
Payout ratio 0.519 0.407 0.503 0.375 0.535 0.392 
R&D intensity (%) 0.045 0.000 0.049 0.000 0.041 0.000 
PPE intensity (%) 0.322 0.255 0.313 0.256 0.331 0.255 
Capital expenditure / Sales 0.068 0.048 0.065 0.052 0.070 0.049  
Cash / Assets 0.109 0.048 0.109 0.047 0.108 0.051 
Firm Size 28,561.20 3,573.04 28,554.09 3,619.28 28,568.32 3,210.98 
Board size 10.131 10.000 10.266 10.000 9.995 9.500 
Outside directors (%) 0.781 0.818 0.783 0.800 0.780 0.824 
Non-busy directors (%) 0.657 0.700 0.668 0.667 0.647 0.714 
Insider ownership 10.564 4.065 9.387 4.000 11.741 4.090 
Outside block ownership 23.824 12.285 32.415 11.200 15.233* 12.470 
CEO total compensation 3,314,797 1,287,344 3,226,066 1,448,884 3,403,529 1,218,379 * 
Director age 57.83 59 57.418 60 58.25 59 
Segments 4.248 3.9 4.486 4 4.16 3.8 
Information asymmetry  0.235 0.125 0.239 0.123 0.232  0.131 
Product market concentration  0.613 0.452 0.624 0.504 0.593 0.434 
Tobin's Q (year -1) 1.673 1.400 1.734 1.483 1.613 1.344 
Return on Assets (year -1) 0.177 0.148 0.161 0.157 0.193 0.135 
Market to Book ratio 2.042 1.484 2.125 1.567 1.959 1.411 
              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
68 
 
 
Panel B: Comparison of parent firm CEOs and Division CEOs 
 
 
 
Full Sample 
(N = 109) 
 
Parent firm CEOs 
(N = 79) 
 
Division CEOs 
(N = 30) 
 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
 
      
Number of financial experts 57  44  13  
Leverage 0.261 0.262 0.261 0.279 0.260 0.256 
Operating cash flow / Assets 0.142 0.137 0.141 0.137 0.144 0.137 
Cash & Investment / Assets 0.165 0.114 0.162 0.116 0.173 0.113 
Payout ratio 0.503 0.375 0.446 0.356 0.652 0.462 
R&D intensity (%) 0.049 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.047 0.000 
PPE intensity (%) 0.313 0.256 0.333 0.259 0.263 0.239 
Capital expenditure / Sales 0.065 0.052 0.067 0.051 0.062 0.056 
Cash / Assets 0.109 0.047 0.103 0.047 0.124 0.048 
Firm Size: Parent 28,554 2,619 26,586 2,581 33,734* 2,748 
Firm Size: spun-off unit 
(year +1) 
6,539 666 6,015 652 7,918 701 
Relative size 1 
(Market value of assets) 
0.383 0.272 0.423 0.294 0.273 * 0.253* 
Relative size 2  (Total assets) 0.229 0.254 0.226 0.253 0.235 0.255 
Board size 10.266 10.000 10.228 9.000 10.367 11.000 
Outside directors (%) 0.783 0.800 0.781 0.818 0.788 0.793 
Non-Busy directors (%) 0.668 0.667 0.706 0.667 0.565 0.575 
Insider ownership 9.387 4.000 10.078 4.000 7.567 3.840 
Outside block ownership (%) 13.172 11.200 15.224 14.900 7.769*** 5.850 
CEO total compensation 3,226,066 1,448,884 2,524,740 1,304,867 5,072,891* 1,846,924 
Segments 4.486 4 4.304 4.3 4.966 4.0 
Distance 647.1 309.0 639.5 231.0 667.3 * 404.0 ** 
Publicly traded units 
b/f spin-offs 
29 
 
18 
 
11 
 
Product market concentration 
(spun-off unit) 
0.622 0.502 0.654 0.533 0.575 0.443 
Information asymmetry 0.239 0.208 0.236 0.206 0.240 0.211 
Tobin's Q (year -1) 1.734 1.483 1.709 1.556 1.801 1.393 
Return on Assets (year-1) 0.161 0.157 0.157 0.160 0.172 0.152 
Market to Book ratio 2.125 1.567 2.009 1.667 2.428 1.478 
Same industry spin-off (FF 48) 20 
 
15 
 
5 
 
Same industry spin-off (SIC 3) 28  20  8  
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Table 2.3: Abnormal returns on spin-off announcement    
 
This table presents the three-day cumulative abnormal returns, CAR (-1, +1), where day 0 
is the spin-off announcement date for a sample of 109 firms that completed spin-offs over 
the sample period from 1994 to 2009.  The cumulative abnormal returns are adjusted by 
three different models: market model, Fama-French three factors and the Fama-French 
three factors and momentum factor model.  Panel A compares spin-off firms’ abnormal 
returns on spin-off announcement to non-spin-off firms.  Panel B shows the mean (median) 
of abnormal spin-off announcement returns for 79 parent firm CEOs and 30 division CEOs.  
In Panel C, CEOs at spun-off units are classified as financial and non-financial experts. 
There are 57 financial expert CEOs and 52 non-financial experts. Two-sample t-tests are 
conducted to compare the difference of means of samples in Panel A and Panel B.  
Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***,**, and *, 
respectively.     
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Panel A: spin-off announcement returns for spin-offs firms and non-spin-offs 
 
CAR (-1,1) 
CAR (-1,1) 
Fama-French 
CAR (-1,1) 
Fama-French & Momentum 
Spin-off firms 
(N=109) 
   
Mean 3.649 ** 3.511 ** 3.371 ** 
Median 2.840 ** 2.390 ** 2.435 ** 
Non spin-off  firms (N=109) 
   
Mean 0.762 0.632 0.599 
Median 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Difference 
   
Mean 2.923 ** 2.879 ** 2.772 ** 
 
Panel B: spin-off announcement returns for parent firm CEOs and division CEOs 
 
CAR (-1,1) 
CAR (-1,1) 
Fama-French 
CAR (-1,1) 
Fama-French & Momentum 
Parent firm CEOs (N=79)    
Mean 4.256 ** 4.062 ** 3.870 ** 
Median 3.744 * 2.804 * 2.929 * 
Division CEOs (N=30) 
   
Mean 2.051* 2.059* 2.057* 
Median 1.259* 1.201* 1.114* 
Difference 
   
Mean 2.205* 2.003* 1.813* 
 
Panel C: spin-off announcement returns for financial expert CEOs and non-financial expert CEOs 
 
CAR (-1,1) 
CAR (-1,1) 
Fama-French 
CAR (-1,1) 
Fama-French & Momentum 
Financial Expert CEOs (N=57)    
Mean 5.879 ** 5.758 ** 5.499 ** 
Median 3.625 ** 3.026 ** 2.985 ** 
Non-Financial Expert CEOs  (N=52) 
   
Mean 1.203 ** 1.048 * 1.038 * 
Median 0.986 * 0.906 * 0.900 * 
Difference 
   
Mean 4.675 ** 4.710 ** 4.460 ** 
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Table 2.4: Regression of parent firm CEOs, division CEOs, and financial experts on 
abnormal returns on spin-off announcement 
 
This table reports regression estimates of the impact of parent firm CEOs, division CEOs 
and financial expert CEOs on spin-off announcement abnormal returns.  Dependent 
variable is the cumulative abnormal announcement returns (i.e.CAR (-1,+1)).  Spun off 
units’ growth opportunities are the ratio of research and development expenditure to the 
book value of assets at year-end (R&D) during the three years preceding the spin-off 
announcement.  t-statistics based on robust standard errors and clustered by year and firm 
are reported in parentheses.  Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is 
indicated by ***,**, and *, respectively. 
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CAR (-1,1) 
CAR (-1,1) 
Fama-French 
CAR (-1,1) 
Fama-French & Momentum 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Parent firm CEOs (PE) 0.022*  0.024*  0.023*  
 (1.82)  (1.75)  (1.70)  
Financial Expert (FE) 0.005** 0.021** 0.006** 0.019** 0.010** 0.020** 
 (2.18) (2.03) (2.21) (2.08) (2.38) (2.07) 
PE × FE -0.026  -0.025  -0.030  
 (-0.92)  (-0.92)  (-0.90)  
Division CEOs (DM)  -0.022*  -0.024*  -0.023* 
  (-1.82)  (-1.75)  (-1.70) 
DM × FE  0.026**  0.025**  0.030** 
  (2.22)  (2.22)  (2.10) 
Growth opportunities- R&D 0.002* 0.002* 0.003** 0.003** 0.002* 0.002* 
 (1.75) (1.75) (2.29) (2.29) (1.88) (1.88) 
Information asymmetry -0.006 -0.006 0.010 0.010 -0.022 -0.022 
 (-0.09) (-0.09) (0.13) (0.13) (-0.37) (-0.37) 
Average changes in Tobin's Q (-2) 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 
 (1.25) (1.25) (1.27) (1.27) (1.31) (1.31) 
Same industry spin-off (FF 48) -0.009 -0.009 -0.015 -0.015 -0.013 -0.013 
 (-0.69) (-0.69) (-1.29) (-1.29) (-1.06) (-1.06) 
Independent directors (%) 0.053 0.053 0.048 0.048 0.049 0.049 
 (1.37) (1.37) (1.17) (1.17) (1.21) (1.21) 
Non-busy directors (%) 0.015 0.015 0.013 0.013 0.010 0.010 
 (0.84) (0.84) (0.79) (0.79) (0.63) (0.63) 
Insider ownership 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (1.52) (1.52) (1.62) (1.62) (1.66) (1.66) 
Outside block ownership 0.000** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (2.45) (2.45) (3.23) (3.23) (3.18) (3.18) 
Segment 0.045** 0.045** 0.045** 0.045** 0.041** 0.041** 
 (1.98) (1.98) (2.10) (2.10) (2.01) (2.01) 
Publicly traded units b/f spin-offs -0.009 -0.009 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 -0.006 
 (-0.37) (-0.37) (-0.09) (-0.09) (-0.28) (-0.28) 
Relative size 1 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.010 
 (0.70) (0.70) (0.51) (0.51) (0.60) (0.60) 
Leverage -0.042 -0.042 -0.040 -0.040 -0.033 -0.033 
 (-0.86) (-0.86) (-0.74) (-0.74) (-0.66) (-0.66) 
PPE intensity (%) -0.043 -0.043 -0.034 -0.034 -0.035 -0.035 
 (-1.56) (-1.56) (-1.27) (-1.27) (-1.23) (-1.23) 
R&D intensity (%) 0.096 0.096 0.091 0.091 0.086 0.086 
 (1.73) (1.73) (1.55) (1.55) (1.38) (1.38) 
Intercept -0.111 -0.059 -0.117 -0.064 -0.106 -0.053 
 (-2.63) (-1.47) (-2.58) (-1.56) (-2.56) (-1.52) 
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.09 0.109 0.109 0.105 0.105 
N 109 109 109 109 109 109 
Cluster Year/firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 2.5: Univariate tests of changes in external financing 
 
This table reports the difference of and changes in abnormal external financing activities 
in a sample of 109 spin-offs and non-spin-offs in Panel A and 79 parent firm CEOs and 30 
division CEOs in Panel B.  Panel C shows the difference in dollar amount of external 
financing by financial experts in our sample.  In order to measure the amount of net equity 
and the net debt issued, we follow the methods suggested by Hovakimian et al. (2001, 
2004). The last two columns, (5) and (6), in Panel A and B present the changes and average 
two-year changes of external financing before and after spin-offs.  The mean and median 
dollar amount of equity and debt are specified in millions of dollars.  We classify the 
following types of parent firm CEOs and division CEOs as financial experts: directors 
serving on the audit committees or in financial institutions before the spin-off 
announcement and financial industry experience for current or past employment in a 
financial firm (SIC 6000-6999) suggested by Fracassi and Tate (2012) and Guner et al. 
(2008). Two-sample t-tests are conducted to compare the difference of means between 
samples.  Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***,**, and 
*, respectively.  
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Panel A: Differences in external capital raised by between spin-off and its matching firms  
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 Year -2 -1 1 2  Δ(-1, +1) Δ (-2, +2) 
Spin-offs Equity 27.250 30.581 99.391 51.627  68.810* 46.594* 
         
N =109 Debt 163.599 144.106 248.291 324.885  104.185** 132.735** 
         
 Total 190.849 174.686 347.681 376.512  172.995 ** 179.329 ** 
         
Non –spin-offs Equity 36.904 28.132 34.351 14.044  6.219 -8.321 
         
N =109 Debt 186.411 153.166 168.972 195.920  15.806 12.657 
         
 Total 223.315 181.298 203.322 209.963  22.024 4.336 
         
Difference Equity -9.654 2.448 65.040** 37.584*  62.591** 54.914** 
 Debt -22.812 -9.060 79.319** 128.965**  88.379** 120.078** 
 Total -32.466 -6.612 144.359** 166.549**  150.971 ** 174.993 ** 
 
 
Panel B: Differences in external capital raised by between parent firm CEOs and division CEOs  
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
  -2 -1 1 2  Δ (-1, +1) Δ (-2, +2) 
Parent 
firm CEOs 
N = 79 
 
Equity -9.923 1.736 70.365 54.245  68.629* 66.398* 
        
Debt -23.504 -10.690 99.235 148.369  109.925* 140.899* 
        
Total -33.426 -8.954 169.600 202.614  178.554* 207.297* 
         
Division 
manager CEOs 
N =30 
 
Equity -8.946 4.324 21.017 -6.291  56.693 24.674* 
        
Debt -20.990 -4.769 26.874 77.867  31.643* 65.250* 
        
Total -29.937 -0.445 77.890 71.576  78.336* 89.924* 
         
Difference Equity -0.976 -2.578 19.348 60.536  21.936 41.724 
 Debt -2.513 -5.921 72.361 70.502  78.283* 75.649* 
 Total -3.490 -8.509 91.710 131.038  100.218* 117.373* 
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Panel C: The amount of external capital raised by financial and non-financial experts     
Δ Year  (-1,1) 
 
Total external financing Equity financing Debt financing 
 Financial 
expert CEOs 
Non-financial 
expert CEOs 
Financial 
expert CEOs 
Non-financial 
expert CEOs 
Financial 
expert CEOs 
Non-financial 
expert CEOs 
Parent 
firm 
CEOs 
N = 44 N = 35 N = 44 N = 35 N = 44 N = 35 
205.581** 144.577 82.325** 38.839 113.256** 105.738 
       
Divisi
on 
manag
er 
CEOs 
N =13 N =17 N =13 N =17 N =13 N =17 
161.975* 14.376 51.546 42.982 110.429** -28.606 
 
  
    
Total 195.636** 102.011 83.025* 40.194 112.611** 61.818 
       
Δ Year  (-2,2) 
 
Total external financing Equity financing Debt financing 
 Financial 
expert CEOs 
Non-financial 
expert CEOs 
Financial 
expert CEOs 
Non-financial 
expert CEOs 
Financial 
expert CEOs 
Non-financial 
expert CEOs 
Parent 
firm 
CEOs 
N = 44 N = 35 N = 44 N = 35 N = 44 N = 35 
228.953** 180.072 80.632* 48.504 148.321 131.568 
       
Divisi
on 
manag
er 
CEOs 
N =13 N =17 N =13 N =17 N =13 N =17 
194.479* 9.971 51.258* 4.345 143.221** 5.625 
 
  
    
Total 221.091** 124.462 73.933** 34.068 147.158** 90.395 
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Table 2.6: Regression of financial expertise on abnormal changes in external capital  
       
This table reports regression estimates of the impacts of financial expertise on abnormal 
changes in external financing activities.  Full sample consists of 109 firms that completed 
spin-offs in the period 1994 to 2009 including 79 parent firm CEOs and 30 division 
CEOs.  The dependent variable is the change in industry-adjusted external financing before 
and after spin-off. Industry-adjusted external financing is the difference between 109 spin-
off and non-spin-offs.  T-statistics based on robust standard errors and clustered by year 
and firms are reported in parentheses.  Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
is indicated by ***,**, and *, respectively. 
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Panel A: Abnormal changes in external financing activities ($); ΔYear (-1, +1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Parent firm CEOs (PE) 1.775**   2.021*   
 (2.25)  (2.24)  
Financial Expert (FE)  2.593** 4.665** 1.880** 
  (2.32) (2.00) (2.02) 
PE × FE   -2.785  
   (-0.44)  
Division CEOs (DM)    -2.021** 
    (-2.12) 
DM × FE    2.785** 
    (2.46) 
Growth opportunities- R&D 0.176 0.368 0.277 0.277 
 (1.16) (1.38) (1.28) (1.33) 
Information asymmetry 0.141 0.841 0.697 0.697 
 (0.26) (0.63) (0.59) (0.34) 
Average changes in Tobin's Q (-2) 1.178 1.175 1.237 1.237 
 (1.10) (1.01) (1.03) (1.31) 
Same industry spin-off (FF 48) -0.448 -0.518 -0.545 -0.545 
 (-0.28) (-0.35) (-0.36) (-0.48) 
Independent directors (%) 3.337 4.373* 4.421* 4.421** 
 (1.42) (1.69) (1.71) (2.07) 
Non-busy directors (%) 0.238 0.191 0.409 0.409 
 (0.28) (0.22) (0.39) (0.48) 
Insider ownership -0.022 -0.024 -0.022 -0.022 
 (-0.80) (-1.17) (-1.02) (-0.76) 
Outside block ownership 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 
 (2.54) (2.18) (2.14) (2.20) 
Segment  -1.021 -1.322 -1.098 -1.098 
 (-1.09) (-1.28) (-1.08) (-1.09) 
Publicly traded units b/f spin-offs -1.263 -1.286 -1.32 -1.32 
 (-1.26) (-1.10) (-1.13) (-1.47) 
Relative size 1 (Market Value assets) 1.023 1.063 0.94 0.94 
 (1.50) (1.40) (1.23) (1.28) 
Leverage -0.549 -0.721 -1.269 -1.269 
 (-0.23) (-0.33) (-0.61) (-0.60) 
PPE intensity (%) 0.433 -0.224 -0.308 -0.308 
 (0.18) (-0.09) (-0.12) (-0.15) 
R&D intensity (%) 2.692 2.004 2.243 2.243 
 (0.75) (0.49) (0.55) (0.58) 
Intercept 0.291 0.029 -1.616 0.045 
 (0.09) (0.01) (-0.52) (0.14) 
Adjusted R2 0.026 0.077 0.09 0.09 
N 109 109 109 109 
Robust  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster Year/firm  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
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Panel B: Abnormal changes in external financing activities ($); ΔYear (-2, +2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Parent firm CEOs (PE) 1.384**  1.614**  
 (1.97)  (2.11)  
Financial Expert (FE)  2.437** 4.474** 1.786** 
  (2.29) (2.07) (1.96) 
PE × FE   -2.688  
   (-0.21)  
Division CEOs (DM)    -1.614* 
    (-1.74) 
DM × FE    2.688** 
    (2.44) 
Growth opportunities- R&D 0.42 0.893* 0.667 0.667* 
 (1.32) (1.70) (1.52) (1.71) 
Information asymmetry 0.817 0.973 0.844 0.844 
 (0.00) (0.80) (0.63) (0.76) 
Average changes in Tobin's Q (-2) 2.305 2.068 2.238 2.238 
 (1.49) (1.40) (1.39) (1.59) 
Same industry spin-off (FF 48) -1.082 -1.09 -1.139 -1.139 
 (-0.84) (-0.86) (-0.87) (-1.06) 
Independent directors (%) 2.743 3.177 3.242 3.242 
 (0.82) (0.93) (0.94) (1.29) 
Non-busy directors (%) 0.778 0.311 0.795 0.795 
 (0.78) (0.39) (0.71) (0.82) 
Insider ownership -0.022 -0.024 -0.019 -0.019 
 (-1.09) (-1.10) (-0.90) (-0.52) 
Outside block ownership 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (1.52) (1.82) (1.19) (1.17) 
Segment 0.253 0.008 0.400 0.400 
 (0.21) (0.01) (0.35) (0.32) 
Publicly traded units b/f spin-offs 0.251 0.12 0.099 0.099 
 (0.16) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) 
Relative size 1 (Market Value assets) 0.382 0.734 0.436 0.436 
 (0.41) (0.72) (0.44) (0.54) 
Leverage -2.239 -2.143 -3.081 -3.081 
 (-0.92) (-0.95) (-1.37) (-1.17) 
PPE intensity (%) 1.863 2.082 1.813 1.813 
 (0.89) (1.11) (0.81) (0.73) 
R&D intensity (%) 4.752 4.433 4.841 4.841 
 (1.02) (0.86) (0.97) (0.87) 
Intercept 0.426 -0.021 -1.306 0.309 
 (0.15) (-0.01) (-0.45)  
Adjusted R2 0.013 -0.049 0.019 0.019 
N 109 109 109 109 
Robust Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster Year/firm Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 2.7: Univariate tests of changes in operating cash flow returns  
 
This table presents the difference and the changes in operating cash flows returns for 109 
spin-offs and non-spin-offs in Panel A and 79 parent firm CEOs and 30 division CEOs in 
Panel B.  Panel C shows the difference and the changes in operating cash flows returns by 
spun-off unit CEOs with financial expertise in our sample. Operating cash flows are 
measured by two different methods suggested by Denis and McKoen (2012) as Operating 
Cash Flow (1) and Chemmanur et al. (2010) as Operating Cash Flow (2) and each firm’s 
operating cash flow is scaled by its total assets.  Years -1 and -2 are measured relative to 
the year of spin-off announcement, while Year +1 and +2 are measured relative to the year 
of spin-off execution.  Year (-1, +1) and Year (-2, +2) present the changes in one-year and 
in average two-years of operating cash flows around spin-offs.  Two-sample t-tests 
(Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests) are conducted to compare the difference of means 
(medians) of samples.  Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated 
by ***,**, and *, respectively. 
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Panel A: Operating cash flow return between spin-off firms and non-spin-off firms  
Operating Cash Flow (1) / Assets 
       
 Year -2 Year -1 Year +1 Year +2 Δ Year (-1, +1)  Δ Year (-2, +2) 
Spin-off firms        
Mean 0.112 0.111 0.122 0.124 0.011**  0.012* 
Median 0.108 0.108 0.134 0.125 0.020**  0.019** 
N = 109 
      
 
Non-spin-off firms 
      
 
Mean 0.110 0.110 0.106 0.106 -0.004  -0.004 
Median 0.111 0.110 0.101 0.106 -0.009*  -0.007 
N = 109 
       
Difference 
       
Mean 0.002 0.001 0.016** 0.018* 0.015** 
 
0.015* 
 
Operating Cash Flow (2) / Assets 
       
 Year -2 Year -1 Year +1 Year +2 Δ Year (-1, +1) 
 
Δ Year (-2, +2) 
Spin-off firms        
Mean 0.133 0.135 0.144 0.145 0.009**  0.011* 
Median 0.130 0.134 0.149 0.147 0.015*  0.016* 
N = 109 
       
Non-spin-off firms 
       
Mean 0.132 0.134 0.130 0.132 -0.004  -0.002 
Median 0.133 0.137 0.129 0.130 -0.009*  -0.006 
N = 109 
       
Difference 
       
Mean 0.001 0.001 0.014* 0.013** 0.013** 
 
0.013* 
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Panel B: Operating cash flow returns between parent firm CEOs and division CEOs 
Operating Cash Flow (1) / Assets 
       
 Year -2 Year -1 Year +1 Year +2 Δ Year (-1, +1)  Δ Year (-2, +2) 
Parent firm CEOs        
Mean 0.003 0.001 0.019 0.022 0.018*  0.018* 
Median 0.002 -0.001 0.010 0.010 0.011*  0.010* 
N = 79 
       
Division CEOs 
       
Mean -0.001 0.001 0.008 0.007 0.007* 
 
0.007* 
Median 0.000 -0.001 0.004 0.003 0.005 
 
0.003 
N = 30 
       
Difference 
       
Mean 0.003 0.000 0.011 0.015* 0.011* 
 
0.011* 
 
 
Operating Cash Flow (2) / Assets 
       
 Year -2 Year -1 Year +1 Year +2 Δ Year (-1, +1) 
 
Δ Year (-2, +2) 
Parent firm CEOs        
Mean 0.001 0.001 0.017 0.017 0.016*  0.016* 
Median 0.001 0.000 0.012 0.012 0.012*  0.010* 
N = 79 
       
Division CEOs 
       
Mean 0.001 -0.001 0.004 0.003 0.005* 
 
0.003 
Median 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.002 
 
0.002 
N = 30 
       
Difference 
       
Mean 0.000 0.002 0.014* 0.014** 0.011* 
 
0.013* 
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Panel C: Operating cash flow returns between financial experts and non-financial experts 
Δ Year (-1,1) 
 
Operating Cash Flow / Assets (1) Operating Cash Flow / Assets (2) 
 
Financial expert Non-financial expert Financial expert Non-financial expert 
Parent firm N = 44 N = 35 N = 44 N = 35 
CEOs 0.021** 0.014 0.020** 0.011 
     
Division N = 13 N =17 N =13 N =17 
CEOs 0.016* 0.000 0.010* 0.001 
     
Total 0.020 ** 0.009 0.018 * 0.008 
     
Δ Year (-2,2) 
 
Operating Cash Flow / Assets (1) Operating Cash Flow / Assets (2) 
 
Financial expert Non-financial expert Financial expert Non-financial expert 
Parent firm N = 44 N = 35 N = 44 N = 35 
CEOs 0.022** 0.014 0.019* 0.012 
     
Division N =13 N =17 N =13 N =17 
CEOs 0.016* 0.001 0.008* 0.000 
     
Difference 0.021 ** 0.010 0.016 * 0.010 
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Table 2.8: Regression of parent firm CEOs’ impact on abnormal changes in operating 
cash flows returns      
 
This table presents the results of OLS regression of changes in abnormal operating cash 
flows on parent firm CEOs and other controls.  Full sample consists of 109 firms that 
completed spin-offs in the period 1994 to 2009, including 79 firms assigning one of its 
executives as CEO of the spun-off unit (i.e. parent firm CEOs) and 30 firms appointing 
former division head as CEO of the spun-off unit (i.e. division CEOs). In addition, 109 
spin-off samples are classified as spun-off unit CEOs with financial expertise and non-
financial expertise.  Dependent variable is the change in abnormal operating cash flow 
returns measured in two different ways suggested by Denis and McKeon (2012) as OCF 
(1) and Chemmanur et al. (2010) as OCF (2).  Abnormal operating cash flows are the 
difference between spin-offs’ and matching non-spin-offs’ operating cash flows. T-
statistics based on robust standard errors and clustered by year and firms are reported in 
parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***,**, 
and *, respectively.          
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Panel A: Parent firm CEOs’ impact on abnormal changes in operating cash flow (1) returns 
 Δ Operating Cash Flow / 
 Assets (-1, +1) 
Δ Operating Cash Flow /  
Assets  (-2, +2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Parent firm CEOs (PE) 0.091**  0.089**  
 (1.96)  (1.99)  
PE × FE -0.119  -0.108  
 (-0.72)  (-0.69)  
Financial Expert (FE) 0.054* 0.066* 0.047** 0.061* 
 (1.74) (1.67) (1.97) (1.64) 
Division CEOs (DM)  -0.091**  -0.089** 
  (-1.96)  (-1.99) 
DM × FE  0.119*  0.108** 
  (1.92)  (1.99) 
Growth opportunities- R&D 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 
 (0.42) (0.42) (0.68) (0.68) 
Information asymmetry -0.037 -0.037 -0.079 -0.079 
 (-0.15) (-0.15) (-0.30) (-0.30) 
Average changes in Tobin's Q (-2) -0.015 -0.015 -0.004 -0.004 
 (-0.14) (-0.14) (-0.04) (-0.04) 
Same industry spin-off (FF 48) -0.089 -0.089 -0.093 -0.093 
 (-1.30) (-1.30) (-1.34) (-1.34) 
Independent directors (%) 0.071 0.071 0.092 0.092 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.61) (0.61) 
Non-busy directors (%) 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) 
Insider ownership -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (-0.93) (-0.93) (-0.92) (-0.92) 
Outside block ownership 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-0.27) (-0.27) (0.88) (0.88) 
Segment 0.019 0.019 0.027 0.027 
 (0.46) (0.46) (0.67) (0.67) 
Publicly traded units b/f spin-offs -0.038 -0.038 -0.048 -0.048 
 (-0.38) (-0.38) (-0.50) (-0.50) 
Relative size 1 -0.202 -0.202 -0.210 -0.210 
 (-0.90) (-0.90) (-0.95) (-0.95) 
Leverage 0.218 0.218 0.161 0.161 
 (0.76) (0.76) (0.57) (0.57) 
PPE intensity (%) -0.053 -0.053 -0.043 -0.043 
 (-0.64) (-0.64) (-0.52) (-0.52) 
R&D intensity (%) 0.127 0.127 0.236 0.236 
 (0.53) (0.53) (1.10) (1.10) 
Intercept -0.052 0.039 -0.050 0.039 
 (-0.30) (0.26) (-0.27) (0.23) 
Adjusted R2 0.027 0.027 0.04 0.04 
N 109 109 109 109 
Cluster Year/firm Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Panel B: Parent firm CEOs’ impact on abnormal changes in operating cash flow (2) returns 
 Δ Operating Cash Flow /  
Assets (-1, +1) 
Δ Operating Cash Flow / 
 Assets  (-2, +2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Parent firm CEOs (PE) 0.122*  0.123*  
 (1.92)  (1.91)  
PE × FE -0.189  -0.160  
 (-0.88)  (-0.72)  
Financial Expert (FE) 0.100* 0.088* 0.074* 0.086* 
 (1.71) (1.89) (1.65) (1.64) 
Division CEOs (DM)  -0.122*  -0.089** 
  (-1.92)  (-1.99) 
DM × FE  0.189**  0.108** 
  (1.98)  (1.99) 
Growth opportunities- R&D 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.003 
 (0.33) (0.33) (0.58) (0.68) 
Information asymmetry -0.024 -0.024 -0.041 -0.079 
 (-0.07) (-0.07) (-0.12) (-0.30) 
Average changes in Tobin's Q (-2) -0.051 -0.051 -0.042 -0.004 
 (-0.45) (-0.45) (-0.36) (-0.04) 
Same industry spin-off (FF 48) -0.110 -0.110 -0.109 -0.093 
 (-1.32) (-1.32) (-1.28) (-1.34) 
Independent directors (%) 0.126 0.126 0.115 0.092 
 (0.94) (0.94) (0.81) (0.61) 
Non-busy directors (%) 0.047 0.047 0.042 0.024 
 (0.40) (0.40) (0.37) (0.23) 
Insider ownership -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 
 (-0.70) (-0.70) (-0.65) (-0.92) 
Outside block ownership 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.89) (0.88) 
Segment 0.073 0.073 0.079 0.027 
 (1.40) (1.40) (1.45) (0.67) 
Publicly traded units b/f spin-offs -0.050 -0.050 -0.060 -0.048 
 (-0.46) (-0.46) (-0.55) (-0.50) 
Relative size 1 -0.210 -0.210 -0.220 -0.21 
 (-0.85) (-0.85) (-0.91) (-0.95) 
Leverage 0.119 0.119 0.068 0.161 
 (0.36) (0.36) (0.21) (0.57) 
PPE intensity (%) -0.040 -0.040 -0.023 -0.043 
 (-0.45) (-0.45) (-0.25) (-0.52) 
R&D intensity (%) 0.284 0.284 0.307 0.236 
 (1.07) (1.07) (1.19) (1.10) 
Intercept -0.185 -0.063 -0.161 0.039 
 (-0.82) (-0.33) (-0.72) (0.23) 
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.019 0.022 0.04 
N 109 109 109 109 
Cluster Year/firm Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Appendix: Definition of variables  
Total assets - The fiscal year-end total assets.  
 
Firm size - Multiplying the shares outstanding by the closing price at the end of fiscal year.  
 
StockReturn - The cumulative stock return over the last 12 months.  
 
Leverage - The ratio of book value of total debt to book value of total assets.  
 
Turnover - The average of monthly ratios of the number of shares traded to the number of shares 
outstanding during the last 12 months.  
 
Cash flow – The Ratio of earnings less interest and taxes to firm’s book assets.  
 
Leverage - The ratio of book value of total debt to book value of assets   
 
Return on assets - The ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization to 
the book value of total assets 
 
Board size - The number of board directors in the proxy statement  
 
Outside directors - The ratio of outside directors who are not employees of the firm to board size 
 
Non-busy directors - The ratio of directors who holds less than three directorships at other firms 
to board size    
 
Insider ownership - The fraction of outstanding shares held by directors and executive officers   
 
Outside block ownership - The fraction of outstanding shares owned by institutional investors in 
the proxy statement. An institutional investor is defined as a shareholder who holds more than 5% 
of outstanding shares  
 
CEO total compensation - The sum of cash pay and equity-based pay  
 
Director age - The age in years when parent firms announce the spin-off  
 
Information asymmetry - The standard deviation of the three-day abnormal returns around the 
announcement of quarterly earnings during the three years preceding the announcement of the 
spin-off  
 
Product market concentration - Herfindahl index based on each firm’s asset   
 
Relative size 1 (2) - The market value of assets (total assets) of spun-off units measured in the 
year succeeding the spin-off execution (year +1) over parent firms’ market value of assets (total 
assets) measured in year -1 
 
Publicly traded units b/f spin-offs - The number of spun-off units that were already publicly 
traded before the spin-off announcement 
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